Looking Back, Looking Forward:
Reflections on Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security

December 2015

Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada
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<tr>
<td>1C</td>
<td>One Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>3D</td>
<td>Defence, Diplomacy, Development</td>
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<td>ATIP</td>
<td>Access to Information and Privacy</td>
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<td>CAF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>C-NAP</td>
<td>Canadian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
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<td>DFAIT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DFATD</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defence</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-Affected States</td>
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<td>GPSF</td>
<td>Gender, Peace and Security Fund</td>
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<td>HI</td>
<td>Humane Internationalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTQ</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer/Questioning</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NGDO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Development Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution(s)</td>
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<td>SGBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<td>START</td>
<td>Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force</td>
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<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution(s)</td>
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<td>WOG</td>
<td>Whole-of-Government</td>
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<td>WPSN-C</td>
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Introduction
Beth Woroniuk and Sara Walde

The year 2015 was a very busy one for those following the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. It was the 15th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325. UN Women launched The Global Study on the implementation of 1325 (and the subsequent Resolutions) and there was a High-level Review of progress in regards to resolutions on WPS that culminated in a new Security Council resolution: 2242.1 Many organizations took advantage of the anniversary of UNSCR 1325 to release the results of research.2 Other organizations, including the Women, Peace and Security Network-Canada (WPSN-C), drew attention to the limited progress made on the overall implementation of the objectives behind the Resolutions.

2015 was also a busy year in international policy fora generally. Numerous discussions took place including the finalization of the Sustainable Development Goals (with the wins and losses on women, peace and security3), the 2015 Peace Operations Review and the 2015 Paris Climate Conference.

As a backdrop to these events, armed conflicts continue around the world and state fragility threatens millions. Women continue to be excluded from peace processes and sexual violence in conflict remains an ongoing reality. Refugees, including significant numbers of women, continue to flee wars and devastation. Countering terrorism and violent extremism is edging its way into the women, peace and security debate.4 One glimmer of hope was the movement toward peace in Colombia, marked by significant participation of women and women’s organizations.5

Here in Canada, 2015 marked the fifth anniversary of the Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP). In June the Government released the third annual C-NAP progress report covering April 2013 to March 2014. Also in June, the Standing Senate Human Rights Committee heard testimony on Canada’s implementation of Resolution 1325. Members of the WPSN-C

2 For a list of some of these resources, see: http://peacewomen.org/security-council/2015-high-level-review/resources#session-documents
appeared before the Committee, highlighting gaps in the implementation of the C-NAP and noting the importance of funding grassroots organizations.⁶

Also in 2015 former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps released her report on sexual abuse and harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) finding an “underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGTBQ members.”⁷ Further, this year the Government of Canada hosted UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in August and announced significant funding related to sexual violence in conflict.⁸ The Up for Debate Campaign raised women’s rights issues – both domestic concerns and those in Canada’s foreign policy - in the national election campaign.⁹ And – of course - 2015 saw a change in our national government with the election of the Liberal Party of Canada.

These are some of the elements swirling around as we reflect on the reporting on the C-NAP and the possibilities moving forward.

The C-NAP

In 2004 the UN Secretary-General called on Member States to develop national implementation plans for Resolution 1325. Canada responded by releasing the Action Plan for Implementation of United Nations Security Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (the C-NAP) in October 2010, a rather belated document given the much earlier publications and revisions of NAPs by many countries, such the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden.

The C-NAP outlines five broad commitments:

- *Increasing the active and meaningful participation of women, including indigenous and local women, in peace operations and peace processes, in the management of conflict situations, and in decision making in all of these areas.*

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⁹ See [http://upfordebate.ca/]

"Women continue to be excluded from peace processes and sexual violence in conflict remains an ongoing reality. Refugees, including significant numbers of women, continue to flee wars and devastation. Countering violent extremism is edging its way into the women, peace and security debate."
• Increasing the effectiveness of peace operations, including the protection and promotion of the rights and safety of women and girls.

• Improving the capacity of Canadian personnel to help prevent violence and to contribute to protecting the human rights of women and girls in the context of peace operations, fragile states, conflict-affected situations and in humanitarian crises or relief and recovery operations.

• Promoting and supporting relief and recovery efforts in fragile states and conflict-affected countries in a manner which takes into account the differential experiences of women and men, boys and girls.

• Making the leadership of peace operations more accountable for carrying out their mandated responsibilities by realizing, to the maximum extent practicable, the intent of the SCR’s on Women, Peace and Security.

The Plan is structured around the generally-recognized pillars of:

• **Prevention** – integrating a perspective that takes into account the differential experiences of men and women, boys and girls in conflict situations into all conflict prevention activities and strategies; strengthening efforts to prevent violence, including sexual violence, against women and girls in peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations.

• **Participation** – advocating for the active and meaningful participation and representation of women and local women’s groups in peace and security activities, including peace processes.

• **Protection** - protecting women’s and girls’ human rights by helping to ensure their safety, physical and mental health, well-being, economic security, and equality; promoting and protecting the security and rights of women and girls; protecting women and girls from violence, including sexual violence.

• **Relief and recovery** – promoting and working to ensure women’s equal access to humanitarian and development assistance, promoting aid services that support the specific needs and capacities of women and girls in all relief and recovery efforts.\(^{10}\)

To date, three progress reports have been released: 2011-2012, 2012-2013 and 2013-2014. The latest report was accompanied by the publication of the mid-term review conducted by the Institute for Inclusive Security.

**The Response of Civil Society**

In 2014, the WPSN-C released a report entitled *Worth the Wait? Reflections on Canada’s National Action Plan & Reports on Women, Peace & Security*.\(^ {11}\) A collection of nine chapters written by network members and supporters (academics, organizations, and individuals), this report outlined concerns regarding the C-NAP and implementation to that point. Overall, *Worth the Wait?* outlined issues related to the delays in reporting; the monitoring

\(^{10}\) This is the language from the 2010 C-NAP.

\(^{11}\) This report is available at [https://wpsncanada.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/worth-the-wait-report.pdf](https://wpsncanada.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/worth-the-wait-report.pdf)

This year (2015) did see the start of regular consultations between the Government of Canada and civil society on WPS issues. In January 2015, START hosted the first meeting and in June, the WPSN-C hosted a second meeting. There were positive exchanges of information and views at both meetings.

This Report

As with our previous report, Worth the Wait?, the WPSN-C sent out a call to members and academics working on these issues for short reflections on the C-NAP, the three progress reports and related themes. This publication is the result of that request.

Our contributors are a diverse lot – academics (both emerging and established), practitioners and activists. Their perspectives and areas of focus are equally diverse. Some look back, analyzing and commenting on the latest progress report and exploring elements in Canada’s approach to WPS issues. While acknowledging that there have been some advances, contributors note the failure to capitalize on the full potential of the C-NAP as a key policy directive that influences Canada’s approach to conflict-affected states, the continued challenges in the annual reporting (as both an accountability mechanism and an opportunity for reflection on the part of the involved government departments), and the ongoing lack of information on resource investments (overall numbers and trends).

Other contributors look forward, identifying opportunities and options as we look toward the renewal of the C-NAP. These authors highlight the importance of issues the C-NAP does not address (extractive industries) and ways Canada can improve on funding a fundamental WPS issue: sexual violence in conflict. As well, there is a request to broaden the discussions among government officials, civil society and academics to strengthen Canada’s overall approach and effectiveness. The Conclusion also looks forward, outlining key issues to be considered in the process of drafting an updated and revised NAP.

The goal of this report is contribute to the debate and discussion on Canada’s global commitments and contributions to the implementation of the WPS agenda. We hope to strengthen Canadian effectiveness and contributions on this important global issue.

The opinions and views expressed in each contribution are those of its author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of all Network members or the Network as a whole.

The Women, Peace and Security Network – Canada

The WPSN-C is a volunteer network of over 60 Canadian organizations and individuals committed to the following:

1) Promoting and monitoring the efforts of the Government of Canada to implement and support the United Nations Security Council Resolutions on women, peace and security; and,
2) Providing a forum for exchange and action by Canadian civil society on issues related to women, peace and security.

The Network has its origins in the Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group of Peacebuild; however, given Peacebuild’s reduced presence, the Working Group disbanded in 2011 and the WPSN-C was formed in January 2012. We operate with no funding and rely on the goodwill and volunteer contributions of our members – both individuals and organizations. More information on the WPSN-C is available at our website: wpsn-canada.org.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all the contributors for their insights and analysis. We are also grateful to Josée Lafrenière for her review of the draft version of this document.
The Government of Canada's Response to Inclusive Security's Mid-Term Review of the C-NAP

Monique Cuillerier

In 2014, the Institute for Inclusive Security, a US-based organization, was hired by the Canadian government to conduct an independent mid-term review of Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, as called for in the original plan.12

Inclusive Security conducted consultations within the relevant government departments and organizations, as well as with civil society, which included inviting members of the Women, Peace and Security Network - Canada to take part in a day-long consultation in the summer of 2014. The results of this process are presented in the report, Assessment of Canada’s Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2010-2016.13

While acknowledging the significant impact and progress that has been made to date by the Government, Inclusive Security made six key recommendations for improvements to be made to the C-NAP.

Because of the timing of the mid-term review, preparation of the 2013-2014 progress report14 by the Government was already well advanced when Inclusive Security’s report was received by DFATD and the other interested parties. However, the 2013-2014 progress report, tabled in the House of Commons in June 2015, discusses the review and recommendations in order that they might be addressed in a more timely manner than would otherwise be the case.

The first recommendation is to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework in the C-NAP. Although, as Inclusive Security notes, Canada’s NAP is significant for including such a framework, it could be improved by adding “results statements and outcome indicators (to include qualitative indicators), establishing clear baselines and targets, and providing definitions or examples for each indicator.”15

In the progress report, the Government accepted that these monitoring and evaluation practices could be improved and pledged to make adjustments following consultations both internally and with civil society. They intend to be able to implement these changes in time for the 2014-2015 progress report.

15 Inclusive Security p. 19
Another recommendation is to ensure that the annual progress reports are released in a timely manner, as well as being simplified and including more statistical analysis: in particular, year-by-year comparisons in order to clearly illustrate change in the indicators.

Although the Government addresses the continued production of annual reports and the benefits of simplification along with the comparative statistics, the timeliness of reports is not addressed. This is of concern and is an issue that has been previously noted by civil society.  

The third recommendation is for the concerned government departments to meet regularly with civil society. The progress report acknowledges that, while the Government has in the past consulted with civil society, for example, in the original development of the C-NAP and in the process of Inclusive Security’s review, it recognizes the benefit of regularly scheduled meetings. Since the mid-term review, there have been two such meetings held between government and civil society, in February and June 2015.

As well as consulting with civil society, Inclusive Security’s suggestions included that the Government find ways to share best practices and challenges, whether through formal events or informal meetings. Additionally, it was suggested that identifying and promoting senior-level supporters—a so-called high-level champion—of the C-NAP could help to demonstrate that it is a policy priority.

The Government’s response was that, while they do hold regular, formal meetings, they understood the room for improvement, particularly with respect to informal approaches, that could be made in the sharing of practices and information.

There was a less enthusiastic response regarding naming a ‘high-level champion.’ The Government’s position is “that the international agenda for Women Peace and Security, including the prevention of sexual violence in conflict, is at the centre of Canadian policy for promoting the equality between women and men, and the empowerment, human rights and well-being of women and girls” and, presumably, no specific championing is needed.

And lastly, it was recommended that the departments consider regular organization-wide reminders of the C-NAP and how it is relevant to each department’s work.

The Government responded by pointing out that an implementation plan was developed in 2010 in conjunction with the C-NAP, and that the annual progress reports provide general

16 When Rob Nicholson became the new Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs in March 2015, a number of organizations and individuals associated with WPSN-C wrote with suggestions for improving the implementation of the C-NAP; see http://wpsn-canada.org/2015/03/24/letter-to-foreign-minister-rob-nicholson/. These suggestions included addressing the timeliness of the release of the progress reports and improving the tracking of results and actual investments in women, peace and security, as well as addressing women’s participation in peace processes in areas of current conflict, such as Ukraine, South Sudan, and Syria.

17 DFATD p. 3

-9-
suggestions. They acknowledged the benefit of an annual plan that would ensure that the C-NAP "is clearly perceived to be the policy directive that it is."\textsuperscript{18}

In addition to addressing the recommendations from Inclusive Security, the 2013-2014 progress report goes on to highlight the work done in support of gender equality in the areas of humanitarian assistance and development by the former CIDA and the need to determine the lessons learned from those experiences that can be applied to the now-amalgamated DFATD.

This section of the progress report concludes that the Government is "determined that the true legacy of C-NAP will be seen in changed attitudes, as well as the improvement of the skills, knowledge, process and practices to sustain work in support of women and girls in conflict situations."\textsuperscript{19}

The Government’s response to Inclusive Security’s recommendations appears to show a willingness to address many of the areas of reporting that have been identified as problematic. In particular, providing clear statistical data, especially year-to-year comparative data, would allow for clearly identifying areas of success and those in need of improvement, in addition to tracking these changes over time.

However, ignoring the issue of the timely release of the progress reports is a matter of concern. While acknowledging there are layers of bureaucratic and political decision-making that are required to work together in the preparation, approval and release of each report, to date it has taken at least a year (and up to almost two) for each progress report to be released. At that point, the information is unfortunately dated and of limited usefulness, other than historical.

The current C-NAP expires in March 2016. Ideally, the efforts to improve the C-NAP will not go to waste, but be incorporated into a new five-year action plan.

\textsuperscript{18} DFATD p. 3
\textsuperscript{19} DFATD p. 3
Making the Legacy of the C-NAP a Reality

Jo Rodrigues

Point Missed

After reading three progress reports and the mid-term review on the implementation of Canada’s National Action Plan (C-NAP), I concluded an important point had been missed. It is that the plan is an innovative endeavour putting the Canadian government in the role of a catalyst to effectively change how we address conflict and violence.

The C-NAP aims to implement recommendations in the Security Council Resolutions (SCRs) on Women, Peace and Security, namely, to involve and elevate the voices of women in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and to eliminate violence against women and girls. It’s also a step in acknowledging and addressing the particular experience women and girls face in armed conflicts.

The 2013-2014 progress report states: “We are determined that the true legacy of C-NAP will be seen in changed attitudes, as well as the improvement of the skills, knowledge, process and practices to sustain work in support of women and girls in conflict situations.”20

This is encouraging to read, especially in light of the obstacles the government faces. There are two I wish to highlight.

Clarity and Transparency

One obstacle is the continued vague reporting. The report attempts to speak to some gaps through its Lessons Learned section. For instance, it states that combining CIDA and DFAIT – DFATD – will provide opportunities for better coordination because C-NAP partners are better able to share experiences and knowledge.21 Another way to read this is that there have been challenges in the coordination of reporting on the C-NAP in the past. The questions that arise are, why was this the situation, why has it taken the amalgamation of two bodies to prompt such coordination and what specific opportunities are there now that were not there before? Knowing the answers to these questions would make it clear on what is required to make reporting more successful going forward.

The section also acknowledges that gaps are evident in reporting results versus activities and that there are problems providing information for indicators. The reason as to why this is the case is not explicitly reported. Thorough information answering all these questions would give detailed insight on what the gaps are and how to effectively close them. Without this information I am left to guess on what the reasons could be.


21 Ibid p.25
The need for clarity and transparency arises again when reviewing the indicators. Take for example Indicator 2-1, it asks for the percentage of Government of Canada departmental pre-deployment or general training courses. Both DFATD and DND do not provide percentages nor explain why.22 One could conclude that there is a lack of resources to provide such information, that there has been some oversight or that providing such data is not considered valuable.

Indicator 2-3 asks for a report on the extent to which content of mandatory training courses for deployed personnel or for policy and program staff reflect the SCRs on Women, Peace and Security.23 DND shows some progress from not reporting on this indicator in the 2011-2012 progress report24 to reporting on it in the 2012-2013 report.25 DND however repeats, word for word, what it reported on last year for this indicator in the 2013-2014 report. It appears to be a copy-paste approach, which seems careless.

An approach that would demonstrate that DND took reporting on this plan seriously is if it would report on how they have improved in performance of this indicator for 2013-2014, or why they have maintained the status quo from last year or the reason there may have been regression for this indicator.

Reporting achievements and progress is important. Reporting failures, gaps and why they occurred is also important. If failures are not explicitly acknowledged, how can lessons effectively be learned? The Canadian government must demonstrate transparency in order to be accountable to its citizens. Clear and transparent reporting will show Canadians that the government is truly committed to involve and elevate the voices of women in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and to eliminate violence against women and girls.

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22 Ibid p. 32 Note: They do provide some detail of the kind of courses staff attended or that were delivered however this does not make up for the lack of data requested for this indicator or providing an explanation as to why they cannot report on it at this time.

Shared Culture and Understanding

Another obstacle to the C-NAP legacy is a lack of shared culture and understanding among the organizations implementing the plan and collecting the data. This is with respect to the aim of the plan and the context that led to its creation.

The RCMP and DND, two bodies responsible for implementing the C-NAP, need to spend more time and resources in developing a nuanced understanding of Women, Peace and Security issues and addressing gender issues within their respective organizations.

The RCMP has a culture that does not adequately address and stop sexual harassment and abuse from within. Former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps noted in the recent external review of sexual harassment and abuse in the Canadian Armed Forces that “there is an undeniable link between the existence of a hostile organizational culture that is disrespectful and demeaning to women and the poor integration of women into the organization.” DND is the support system of the CAF. With cultures that do not demonstrate value and respect for women by adequately acknowledging the abuse and harassment as well as effectively addressing it, how seriously can Canadians and the international community take the claim that, as part of the implementing group, the RCMP and DND hope to leave a legacy of changed attitudes, as well as improvement in skills, knowledge, process and practices to sustain work in support of women and girls in conflict situations?

Making the Legacy of the C-NAP a Reality

Providing detailed information of failures, gaps, as well as achievements is part of what will make the implementation of the C-NAP a success. It is also imperative that all bodies implementing the plan share the same culture and understanding of Women, Peace and Security issues and the C-NAP to be able to follow through with the commitments and pillars outlined in the plan. Failure to attend to both of these challenges will undermine attempts to realize the C-NAP legacy.

The Canadian government is on the right track by having a national action plan. In addition to addressing the challenges above it needs to show its commitment to the C-NAP and the SCRs on Women, Peace and Security by allocating resources – including sufficient financial resources – to implement it, and demonstrating accountability. This includes renewing the C-NAP after the current one expires, using the recommendations from the mid-term review, Worth the Wait? and this publication to improve the plan and consistently engage

28 Frequently Asked Questions. See question and answer 7 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about/faq.page#q7
stakeholders, like civil society, who can contribute to the overall success of the plan with their insights and experience. In doing so, the Canadian government will be a catalyst to change how conflict and violence is addressed by effectively including and elevating the voices of women in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, and addressing violence against women and girls so that it may be eliminated. It will make the C-NAP legacy a reality.
Recognizing the Full Value of the C-NAP

Kristine St-Pierre

When the call for the development of National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was made in a 2004 UNSC Presidential statement, there was a recognition of the significant role that member states can play in furthering the women, peace and security agenda. NAPs became known as an important mechanism for translating UNSCR 1325 and its related resolutions into specific actions.

The importance of NAPs was meant first and foremost to hold governments accountable for the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda. But as we reflect and learn from more than 10 years of national implementation, it has become clear that NAPs also present two important opportunities for the governments that adopt them.29

First, NAPs provide governments with the opportunity to assess, monitor and strengthen their priorities on women, peace and security. Second, NAPs provide governments with the opportunity to strengthen policy coherence and effectiveness within and across their departments.

These opportunities, however, do not happen in a vacuum. For the above to take place, a government must not only display strong leadership and a high level of commitment toward the women, peace and security agenda; it must also be willing to allocate a specific budget and commit to the implementation of a monitoring and evaluation process that will directly feed into future policy planning and decision-making.

With this in mind, this short brief argues that the Government of Canada’s approach to the monitoring and evaluation of its National Action Plan (C-NAP) has restricted its ability to fully realize its commitments on women, peace and security. This assessment is based on the following observations:

1. In the Worth the Wait? report published in May 2014, Beth Woroniuk argued that the Canadian National Action Plan (C-NAP) indicators—24 in total—“do not function as an effective accountability mechanism.”30 She identified a number of shortcomings, including:
   - A “lack of consolidation, analysis and organization [making] it difficult to understand what has actually happened or not happened;”31

29 Adapted from the 2014 OSCE analysis of the 27 NAPs in the OSCE region.
31 Ibid, 18.
• An absence of targets and a lack of overall context around the indicator data in the annexes, making year-on-year progress difficult to assess;\(^{32}\) and
• Problems with “overlap and duplication” of information.\(^{33}\)

2. The WPSN-Canada submission to the 2015 High Level Review on Security Council Resolution 1325 in April 2015 made similar observations, noting that:

• “The reports focus on activities carried out and there is little analysis of progress;”
• “The reports do not include year-to-year progress comparisons, so it is difficult to see where there have been improvements in the indicators;” and
• “It is difficult to identify what resources the Canadian government is actually investing in WPS initiatives.”\(^{34}\)

3. An analysis of the data presented in the three progress reports published as of November 2015 (covering the fiscal years 2011/12, 2012/13 and 2013/14)\(^{35}\) shows little evidence that the adoption of the C-NAP in 2010 has resulted into strengthened priorities on women, peace and security and better policy coherence among government departments. For example, there remain a number of inconsistencies in the data, including inconsistent reporting across departments and from year to year.

• Indicator 2-1, for example, asks for the percentage of Government of Canada departmental pre-deployment or general training courses that address gender issues; however, not all departments reported a percentage and even when a percentage is provided, there is little explanation as to the exact nature of the training, the content included or even an analysis of ongoing or remaining gaps that need to be addressed.

• Indicator 17-3, for example, asks the extent to which DND/Canadian Forces strategic direction or equivalent policy guidance for deployed Canadian police addresses in a meaningful way the importance of protecting women’s and girl’s human rights. The RCMP is the only department to have reported data, and it did two out of three years.

There is also a lack of explanatory context around the data provided.

• Indicator 17-1, for example, asks the percentage of relevant region- or mission-specific pre-deployment or field training modules for Government of Canada personnel on protection issues that address in a meaningful way the differential impact of the conflict on women and girls. DFATD has one course on gender-based analysis, while the RCMP says they have one module, and DND says that “all” its training addresses the differential impact of conflict on women and girls. However, there is no information on the training modules themselves, or in the case of DND,

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\(^{32}\) Ibid, 19.
\(^{33}\) Ibid, 19.
\(^{35}\) A summary of reporting on the C-NAP indicators is included in Annex 1.
how many trainings there are and for whom, and more specifically, how the differential impact of conflict on women and girls is being addressed or integrated as part of these trainings.

In addition to the above observations, an independent mid-term review undertaken in the summer of 2014 by a U.S.-based organization identified six key recommendations for improving the C-NAP.36 One of these recommendations (the first and arguably most pressing) points to the need to improve the C-NAP’s monitoring and evaluation framework. According to the review, “the CNAP does not contain any results statements, nor does it contain any outcome indicators, which makes it difficult to assess the impact of the CNAP.”37 In other words, while the review argues that current indicators do “an excellent job of measuring progress in terms of output”38—we can see which activities have been done—they do not provide a basis for measuring actual progress with regard to Canada’s support for the women, peace and security agenda.

The mid-term review also finds a “lack of connection to an overarching objective.” This finding is significant when it comes to understanding the full potential of the C-NAP in developing priorities and strengthening policy coherence and effectiveness. Without an explicit connection to one or more overall objective(s)—at foreign policy and/or government-level—the C-NAP will likely remain an afterthought, as opposed to a requirement. One example of this connection can be seen in Norway’s new action plan adopted in February 2015, which identifies a main objective from which four priority areas are derived.39 In the Canadian context, such an objective could not only help focus the government’s efforts, but could also facilitate policy makers’ understanding of the outcomes or results expected from these efforts.

“The main objective of Norway’s work is to ensure that women are able to take part in peace processes and that the rights, needs and priorities of both women and men are addressed in all peace and security efforts.”

  Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

To conclude, while Canada’s National Action Plan has had important points of success—including affirming Canada’s global leadership on women, peace and security, sparking behavioural change within DFATD, and positioning the C-NAP as a meaningful platform for

36 See Monique Cuillerier’s chapter in this compilation for a more in-depth presentation of the mid-term review recommendations.


38 Ibid, 15 (see footnote 6). There is a debate as to whether the current indicators actually do an “excellent job” at measuring progress in terms of outputs. In her chapter in Worth the Wait?, Beth Woroniuk argued that the indicators are confusing and questioned whether they actually measured the best things to measure. See Woroniuk (2014).

  https://www.regieringen.no/globalassets/departementene/ud/vedlegg/fn/ud_handlingsplan_kfs_eng_nettpdf

This brief argues that the C-NAP is still not being used to its full potential. The Canadian landscape surrounding women, peace and security still points to an absence of strong priorities on women, peace and security and to a lack of policy coherence among and across government departments on the issue.

Although there are many actions the government can take to improve the implementation of the C-NAP, addressing ongoing inconsistencies in the monitoring and evaluation process would be an important first step.

For the future—especially when it comes to the development of a new NAP in 2016—it will be important to position the C-NAP within a larger foreign or government-level policy objective. Doing so will make it easier to understand results sought and, in turn, identify actual progress.

National Action Plans (NAPs) are increasingly used around the world as a mechanism to support national level implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). While there is still debate regarding the effectiveness of these Plans, there is a global consensus on their importance. There continue to be global calls for UN Member States to develop and implement NAPs and report on progress. One of the (many) recommendations in the recently released Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the following:

All relevant actors – Member States, civil society, donors and multilateral agencies – should: strengthen national and global reporting mechanisms for monitoring progress in the development and implementation of NAPs, to enhance transparency and facilitate exchange of learning, and scale up good practice.41

In June 2015, the Government of Canada released the third annual report on Canada’s implementation of its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP), covering the period April 2013 to March 2014. The Report represents a great deal of work on the part of the relevant government departments to document their activities in this fiscal year. This brief reflection outlines strengths and weaknesses of the report, and asks whether or not the report provides a clear picture of Canada’s progress on implementing its WPS commitments.

Positive Aspects of the Third Progress Report

While the Report is unwieldy, repetitive and lacks a results focus (more on this below), there are several positive elements:

- The release of the Report was accompanied by the full text of the mid-term review and the Executive Summary provides a ‘management response’ of sorts. This degree of transparency is laudable.

The original NAP called for a mid-term review and the Government must be applauded for following through on this commitment in a serious manner. START allocated resources (financial and human) and contracted a reputable organization (the Institute for Inclusive Security), with significant international experience to undertake the review. The review’s methodology included consultation with Canadian civil society, including a one-day consultation organized by START. The

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contribution by Monique Cuillerier in this collection provides an overview of the recommendations from the mid-term review and the Government’s response.42

- Table 1: Gender equality integration and spending by fiscal year for gender, peace and security funded (GPSF) projects is much appreciated. The Table is clear and complete (with number of projects, percentage of projects and overall spending for each coding category). The conclusions that the quality of GPSF projects (as it relates to gender analysis) has improved and that the number/percentage of gender equality specific initiatives has increased are both clearly illustrated.43

- The Report includes significant examples of concrete initiatives that support WPS aims and objectives. In particular, this reader was struck by the frequency of examples from Afghanistan. Either the Afghanistan program is very good at reporting on its initiatives, or there really has been a significant investment in programming and advocacy initiatives to address women’s rights and participation in this country by Canadian officials. The Burma Border Assistance Program is cited in numerous places as well, and appears to be another good practice.

- Despite the official period of the report being April 2013-March 2014, the authors have chosen to include a few important updates that go beyond that period, in particular relating to the report by retired Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps, examining sexual misconduct and sexual harassment with the Canadian Armed Forces. This flexibility to try to address more recent developments is appreciated.

- The “lessons learned” section does include comments on shortcomings, particularly related to results versus activities, reporting and indicators. It is positive to see the report acknowledge that there are areas for improvement.

- The Annex provides details on activities carried out by the different departments in support of the Actions identified in the C-NAP. While this annex provides significant “raw data,” it is time-consuming to pull out significant trends and difficult to determine impacts.

- Some of the indicators do show improvements. For example, the percentage of women deployed by the RCMP has increased from 10.8% of the first year of C-NAP reporting to 19% in this year’s report.

**Areas for Improvement**

Overall, it appears that the Report continues to be a somewhat mechanical exercise and a lost opportunity for reflection. The Institute for Inclusive Security’s mid-term review noted significant dissatisfaction with the annual reports (on the part of civil society but also from government officials):

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42 It should be noted that while Inclusive Security’s report mentions the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security as one of the successes of Canadian leadership on WPS, the Committee which was established in 2001, had ceased to function by 2004.

43 However interesting to note that the average size of the gender equality specific initiatives (approximately $346,000) was smaller than the projects with ‘limited integration’ (approximately $897,000).
A majority of interviewees see the report as a largely retroactive, attribution exercise meaning that instead of being used as an opportunity to reflect and ask not just “What did we do well?” but also “What could we do better?”, most use it only as an opportunity to ask “What did we do that fits?”

A new NAP (yet to be developed) offers a chance to rethink the role the annual report can play. In addition to being an accountability mechanism, the Government can ask: how can the reporting process facilitate reflection and improvement of Canada’s actions and investments in support of WPS objectives?

At a more detailed level, two of the key weaknesses of the latest Progress Report are dealt with by other contributions in this collection and WPSN-C’s previous Worth The Wait? report:

- The tardiness in reporting (this is addressed in several contributions, including those by Kristine St-Pierre and Jo Rodrigues). Like the previous two progress reports, this one was released well over a year after the period covered in the report. Events have moved on. Data is out of date.

- The incomplete use of indicators (addressed by Kristine St-Pierre in this publication, and my contribution in Worth the Wait?).

Other areas were problems remain include:

a) **Funding data remain incomplete.** Despite the positive inclusion of Table 1 (as mentioned above), several important questions regarding budget allocations to WPS initiatives remain.

- First, we still do not have a clear picture of a) the overall resources being invested in WPS outcomes, and b) whether or not these resources have increased over time. While Table 1 outlines GPFS resources, there is no reporting on overall official development assistance (ODA) investments. GPSF reflects only one part of Canada’s investments in fragile and conflict-affected

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44 Page 17.

45 The previous report of the WPSN-C (Worth the Wait?) noted that the indicator reporting suffered because there was no year-on-year comparison provided. In the document released this gap had not been remedied. Once again, civil society had to pull the indicators together to provide a year-on-year comparison. However there is a note in the report that hints that the government did its own comparison. Under lessons learned/reporting on the C-NAP it says “The review of the aggregated matrix for the last three year of C-NAP’s implementation, which is a new feature of this annual report, revealed some irregularities.” If this matrix was prepared, it is unfortunate that it was not released with the report.

46 The mid-term review notes: “It’s clear that there is no easy way to pull numbers effectively to develop a total amount spent on women, peace and security devoid of caveats.” (page 17) I agree totally with this statement and acknowledge the difficulties with tracking “gender mainstreamed” investments. However, even within these constraints there is significant room for improvement. We would welcome improved reporting on investments, even with the caveats.
states and it is important to know how and to what extent total ODA spending reflects WPS priorities.47

- Second, we do not know the human resources attached to the C-NAP. While it is next to impossible to quantify all the staff time invested in C-NAP-related activities, it would be useful to know who specifically has responsibility for the C-NAP in their job description.

- Third, the quality of the ‘coding’ system for GPSF projects is unclear. The text seems to imply that all that is needed to score “gender equality integrated” is the inclusion of a gender analysis. However, on the development side of GAC (previously DFATD) the criteria include inclusion of an explicit gender equality result at the intermediate level, as well as a gender analysis.48 This seems to be a much higher standard than what is being used by GPSF.

- Fourth, it would be useful to have an annex that lists the projects considered to be “gender equality specific” (title, implementing partner, budget, timeframe) in order to better understand Government of Canada investments and priorities in this area. Civil society has consistently highlighted the importance of funding grassroots women’s organizations, so it would be interesting to get a sense of Canadian support to these under-funded organizations.49

The latest Progress Report identifies strategies used by Canada to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions and it is interesting to note that this list does not include the mobilization of financial resources, given that official development assistance is a major policy lever.50 As well, there is a global consensus that predictable and sustainable financing is a prerequisite for the realization of the WPS agenda.51

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47 Ideally, figures on WPS spending should be reported. If this is not possible with currently accounting frameworks, at a minimum development programs in fragile/conflict-country programs could report on gender equality coding data.

48 While a gender analysis is important and required, by itself it is insufficient. Ideally the analysis has influenced the outcomes of the initiative and there are explicit outcomes that support WPS objectives related to increased participation or improved protection, etc.

49 See, for example, the testimony by Jessica Tomlin, Executive Direction, The MATCH International Women’s Fund at the Senate Standing Committee on Human Rights on June 11, 2015 available at: http://wpsn‐canada.org/2015/06/16/senate‐standing‐committee‐on‐human‐rights‐presentation‐by‐jess‐tomlin‐executive‐director‐match‐international/

50 Section 1.2 notes: “Canada has pledged, through the C-NAP, to use diverse strategies to implement the UN Security Resolutions [sic]. These include advancing international norms and standards, conducting sustained advocacy on a bilateral and multilateral basis, seeking mechanisms for accountability and implementation; and building knowledge and skills for practitioners, among others.”

b) **Discussions of ‘integrating gender into training’ remain problematic.** The report consistently notes that WPS issues have been integrated into training. Yet as has been consistently noted by civil society representatives, this is a difficult and often subjective concept to measure. What one person may consider full integration, another may consider only superficial treatment.

A positive example of civil society/government cooperation on the issues of training is the invitation from the RCMP to the WPSN-C to observe and comment on their pre-deployment training. In August 2015, two WPSN-C representatives observed training sessions and reviewed online materials. They prepared a report and discussed it with the RCMP representatives. They will be invited back to observe a future session of the pre-deployment briefings to assess the extent to which their recommendations have been taken into account. Following this final phase, they will make a public report.

The report notes that training for DFATD staff was delayed given the CIDA/DFAIT merger. We look forward to reporting on the development and implementation-relevant training initiatives in future reports.

c) **There are general statements asserting progress that actually tell us very little.**

Examples include:

- “Canada continued to integrate into its initiatives an analysis of the differential experiences of men and women, boys and girls in conflict contexts” (Section 3.1).

- “Canada ensured that women in fragile or conflict-affected states were given equal opportunity to contribute to the design or implementation of projects…” (Section 3.2.1).

- “Programs in countries hosting refugees, such as Jordan... also integrated gender equality in humanitarian actions…” (Section 3.4.1).

These broad statements are very unclear. Even if an analysis was done for all programs and projects, there is nothing to indicate whether or not this analysis influenced policy directions or program outcomes. Was this a superficial analysis (providing sex-disaggregated data?) or did it robustly explore how gender roles, inequalities and differences influenced and were influenced by the conflict? Were the outcomes for the initiative grounded in the findings of this analysis? Were there actual results that narrowed gender inequalities or contributed to WPS objectives?

d) **There is a gap between what Canada encourages others to do and what we do.** For example, section 3.2.1 notes that the “Government of Canada encourages its partners to aim for at least a 20 percent representative goal of including women in decision-making and police deployments for peace operations.” Yet later on in the same section, the report notes that Canada’s percentage of deployed officers who are female between the April 2012 and Feb 2014 is under 20%. Perhaps our advocacy would be more effective with a stronger national performance?
Conclusion

Overall, while there have been improvements in reporting on the C-NAP since the first Report, gaps still remain. The Report notes that the strongest areas have been “advocacy and policy dialogue on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict situations in a range of fora with a broad group of multilateral partners” (Section 4.0). Yet it is precisely these types of activities that are difficult to assess for results and outcomes. As well, one of the challenges with advocacy initiatives is that credibility for the advocacy rests on many factors: do we back up our advocacy with resource investments; do we practice what we preach in terms of our foreign policy, defense and development initiatives; and is our domestic performance consistent with our international urging? In the last several years, Canada has been lacking on numerous fronts with the failure to bring a rights-based perspective to the Muskoka Initiative (a signature investment in maternal and child health), the lack of a national action plan on violence against women, and the failure to launch an inquiry into the issue of missing and murdered indigenous women.

There are also numerous reporting difficulties built into the structure and nature of the C-NAP itself. As noted above and in the other contributions in this document, many of the indicators are difficult to report on. Many of the actions lack indicators. There is overlap among sections. The section of the C-NAP on prevention does not really deal with supporting WPS objectives relating to the prevention of armed conflict. And so on.

The current C-NAP expires in March of 2016. With the development of a new National Action Plan, there is a possibility to learn from the current reporting structure and process. It will be important to ask: What makes for a good report? Why are these reports being prepared? What do we want these reports to tell us? By critically reviewing this process, the accountability and learning potential of annual reports could be vastly improved.

Sarah Tuckey

The Canadian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP) was released by the Conservative Canadian government in 2010, six years after the call came from the United Nations for member states to release action plans on UN Security Council Resolution 1325. There was a palpable eagerness among gender-equality-focused civil society organizations (CSOs), activists and scholars to see what Canada’s NAP would look like, especially in light of the length of time between the UN call to action and the C-NAP’s release.\(^{52}\) However, upon its release, many were quick to critique the document’s short length, lack of detail or clarity, and lack of targeted funding for the many indicators and actions listed throughout.\(^{53}\) Moreover, despite the commitment made by the Canadian government to annual reports on the C-NAP, the first report tabled in Parliament did not appear publicly until January 2014, a second following quickly in March 2014,\(^{54}\) and a third in June 2015. Indeed, “The Women, Peace and Security Network—Canada had written two letters to the Honourable John Baird, Minister of Foreign Affairs, enquiring about the delay in reporting and asking for more information. These letters went unanswered.”\(^{55}\) The C-NAP reviews appeared to be no clearer or more robust in their commitments to the WPS agenda.\(^{56}\) The lack of information made available to the public, in addition to the opaque language used in the C-NAP and subsequent reports, left many critics thinking pessimistically about the support the WPS agenda received from the Conservative government.

This pessimism among critics is not a new or unfounded phenomenon. CSOs and academics alike have noted the Conservative government’s unwillingness to cooperate or collaborate in general, and on gender equality issues in particular. Indeed, David Black highlights that “the Harper Conservatives have demonstrated their ability to impose far-reaching policy and institutional changes with remarkably limited consultation and consensus building, as


\(^{55}\) Woroniuk and Minnings, “Introduction”, p. 4.

exemplified by the abrupt decision to roll CIDA into the new DFATD". Carrier and Tiessen have highlighted the lack of commitment by the Harper Conservatives to transformational gender equality initiatives via their analysis of the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health. The use of the terminology “equality between women and men” rather than “gender equality” is indicative of the “editing out” and silencing of gender-related issues in Canadian foreign policy more broadly, and speaks to an uncooperative stance on issues that do not align with the Harper government’s ideology. Thus, Black “suggests a need to give closer attention to the macro-political role of political party elites in building the foundation for better aid policies.” Several scholars have provided a closer inspection of the ideological underpinnings of the Harper Conservatives, and when synthesized via a gender perspective, they shed some light on why the C-NAP and its reviews have received so little attention, and why CSOs have to prod the government for any information regarding state action on the WPS agenda. As a whole-of-government document, the C-NAP implicates many actors, and an even more diverse set of initiatives, in delivering on the Canadian implementation of the UN resolutions on WPS. For the Harper Conservatives, the whole-of-government approach, first embraced by the Liberal government of Paul Martin in 2005, represented efficiency, accountability, and transparency across sectors and departments engaged in the implementation of foreign policy. The Harper Conservatives stressed their difference from the original, Liberal conceptualization of whole-of-government as composed of the “3Ds” – Development, Diplomacy, and Defence – to “1C” – one Canada – implying a synchronized and balanced, and above all, fundamentally “Canadian” approach that includes voices from Canadian CSOs and NGOs. Yet CSOs reported great difficulty in attempting to engage with the Conservative government on WPS issues. Why is there such a disconnect between what the Harper Conservatives claimed, and what was experienced first-hand, particularly by those working to advance gender equality?

63 See http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/testing-whole-of-government-in-afghanistan/
64 Ibid.
65 Tiessen, “Gender Essentialism”.


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Black argues that there has been a waning of the traditional “humane internationalist” approach to foreign policy, as it was defined and espoused by Cranford Pratt,66 while Massie and Roussel argue that internationalism is being gradually replaced by “neocontinentalism” via the ideological underpinnings of the Harper Conservatives.67 These arguments go hand in hand from a gender perspective, when considering the importance (or lack thereof) the Harper Conservatives placed on the C-NAP and Canada’s commitments to the WPS agenda overall. A waning of our traditional understanding of Canada as the kind, gentle bringer of peace, only to be replaced by a hard-lined conceptualization of Canada as a military might aligned with its neighbours to the South reveals a parallel: the dichotomization of weakness and might with feminine and masculine. With this shift to a Conservative vision of Canada as a military strength, our focus on gender equality issues (which often get conflated with women’s issues) naturally falls by the wayside.

As synthesized by Black, Pratt “argued that Canadian political culture incorporated a robust and persistent, though eroding, element of ‘humane internationalism’ (HI), defined as an acceptance by the citizens of the industrialized states that they have ethical obligations toward those beyond their borders and that these in turn impose obligations on their governments.”68 Pratt “considered HI the most widely accepted foundation and justification for Canadian aid, as well as the soundest basis for aid ‘effectiveness’ (to put the point in more contemporary terms).”69 Within his conceptualization, Pratt regarded the vast Canadian network of NGOs and CSOs as the most effective and articulate custodians of HI, and supported their importance to Canadian foreign policy creation and implementation over the course of his career.70

However, Black argues that “the ethical clarity of purpose associated with the ‘pure’ articulation of HI is virtually impossible to approach in practice.”71 The conceptualization of HI as wholly altruistic and consensus-based in its delivery of foreign aid is more of an ideal-type that cannot be easily or rigorously measured in practice. The clashing ideologies of the dominant class (those who are in power) and the counter-culture (such as the NGOs and CSOs looking to affect those in power) have not shown to be easily reconciled. Indeed, Black highlights that under the Harper Conservatives, “there has been a steadily growing estrangement between the government and traditional pillars of the counter-consensus, as well as a growing instrumentalization of NGDO [non-government development organization] roles in relation to government policy.”72 This was reflected in the operations of the whole-of-government “1C” approach espoused by the Harper

67 Massie and Roussel, “Twilight”; Massie and Roussel, “Preventing, Substituting”.
69 Ibid., 18.
70 Ibid., 19.
71 Ibid., 22.
72 Ibid., 24.
Conservatives, in that consensus was rarely reached, and priority was often given to the Defence branch of the original “3D” approach, particularly in Afghanistan. Furthermore, instrumentalization of gender equality initiatives has been well documented by critics, who highlight the use of the “women as victims” trope to support continued military-heavy intervention.

In looking at this phenomenon from a gender perspective, Massie and Roussel’s conceptualization of neocontinentalism assists in explaining the growing Conservative estrangement and aversion to the WPS agenda. Neocontinentalism is informed by the continentalist idea that Canadian state and societal interests are inextricably linked with the United States, but includes the added element of neoconservativism, which informs the ideology of the Harper Conservatives. Canadian neoconservativism is not far off from conservativism, in that certain core values, such as a pessimistic view of human nature as violent and prone to conflict and the upholding of Christian religion and tradition, remain distinctively associated with it. Where the difference lies is in the ideological and intellectual fuel provided by a more or less consistent contemporary group of Canadian academics dubbed the “Calgary School.” Their brand of conservativism includes “the idea that ‘evil’ exists and that it is the duty of the citizens and their leaders to act according to ‘what is right.’” Moreover, “at the international level, Canadian neoconservatives express distrust towards international organizations (especially the UN), moral fanaticism against threats to Western liberal democracy and Christian values, unqualified belief in the benefits and benevolence of US hegemony, as well as faith in the use of force as a legitimate tool of statecraft.”

Taken together, the waning of HI and the gradual emergence of neocontinentalism offer a preliminary theoretical explanation for the lack of support given to the WPS agenda and the C-NAP. A focus on gender equality issues, naturally associated with the weak side of the weak-strong dichotomy, did not fit the mould of the Harper Conservatives’ vision of Canada going forward. For the Harper Conservatives, foreign policy became a reflection of ideological interests that began to see a greater amount of much-needed scholarly critique. Indeed, Pratt ensured that within his conceptualization of HI, the power of the dominant class highlighted “enduring biases within the state policy-making apparatus — biases that have tended to fade from view in policy debates on aid (e.g., regarding the aid “architecture” and particular thematic and country priorities), but should not.”

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73 See http://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/testing-whole-of-government-in-afghanistan/
75 Massie and Roussel, « Twilight ».
76 Massie and Roussel, « Twilight ».
77 Massie and Roussel, “Twilight,” p. 39; Gecelovsky, “Prime Minister”.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., p. 41.
80 See the authors and volumes cited in this chapter.
Harper government certainly espoused that “the world is a dangerous place, with many potential enemies that must be neutralized or checked”, as evidenced most recently with the campaign tactics of the party during the 2015 election run. Because of this danger, along with the ultimate need of the Conservatives to exhibit power on the world stage, “force is a legitimate tool to secure the international order and to neutralize and/or punish those who threaten the US-dominated order.”82 This pessimistic belief in human nature naturally allows for the Harper Conservatives to support peacebuilding apparatuses such as the whole-of-government approach, which connects development and diplomacy to defence and military spending, as “an integrated and coherent agenda involving mutually reinforcing development- and security-related policies. From this perspective, for example, antiterrorist policies and development assistance are inextricably linked.”83

This ideologically conservative conceptualization of whole-of-government, driven by the transition from humane internationalism to neocontinentalism, leaves little room for gender equality initiatives such as the WPS agenda. Indeed, we see evidence of this in the reviews, reports, and requests CSOs and NGOs put forth for the government to respond to, which it rarely does. Analysis from Ploughshares show that the C-NAP is lacking in many areas, including missing clear timelines for implementation, lacking a mechanism for tracking the activities and resources directed to the C-NAP, and missing mechanisms that should exist to facilitate ongoing CSO input.84 Similar critiques and calls to action by the WPSN-C provide another example. Within the report Worth the Wait? the critiques are plentiful.85 Swiss demonstrates in his analysis of the two reports on the C-NAP that the combined aid in support of C-NAP from both of the recently merged departments of CIDA and DFAIT amounts to less than 5% of total ODA disbursed by Canada in each of the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 fiscal years, and is suggestive of the low priority accorded the WPS issues in Canada’s aid program.86 Moreover, he summarizes that as a whole, “the reports suggest that Canada has been actively supporting aid programs in support of the UN resolutions, but also suggests that, in spite of the presence of C-NAP, that the aid efforts in this area remain relatively small and fragmented in terms of how they are both implemented and reported.”87

Further research into the connection between the rise of neocontinentalism and the decline of humane internationalism is needed to clearly reveal if this change in foreign policy ideology resulted in a lack of focus on gender equality issues by the Harper Conservatives. However, the evidence presented here is clear: despite all that was said and done by the NGO and CSO “counter-culture”, their efforts fell on deaf ears. When gender equality issues remain on the “weak” and “feminine” side of the weak-strong and feminine-masculine dichotomies, it is much easier for those in power to ignore calls to action by Canadian civil

85 See the various critiques from Worth the Wait? https://wpsncanada.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/worth-the-wait-report.pdf
86 Swiss, “Canadian Foreign Aid,” p. 11.
87 Swiss, “Canadian Foreign Aid,” p. 12.
society. With the change to a Liberal government in the fall of 2015, it remains to be seen whether this conceptualization and ultimate dismissal of gender equality issues continues. Canadian civil society can only continue to work and wait to see real policy change.
Segregating Gender in Canadian Foreign Policy in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

Kirsten Van Houten

Gender considerations are an essential component of fragile-states programming because they address gendered power relations within households and in broader society, which reflect and contribute to conflict dynamics and overall fragility. In addition to addressing these dynamics, fragile, conflict and post-conflict settings present an opportunity to improve women’s participation in economic and political activities as well as to enact new legislation to protect women’s rights and enforce new gender norms.88

A review of Canadian policy and programming in Fragile and Conflict Affected States (FCAS) suggests that opportunities to address power relations within households are being missed, and that efforts to improve women’s participation in economic and political activities are being compromised. Despite commitments to gender mainstreaming elsewhere, C-NAP and recent programming demonstrate that gender is increasingly being approached as a specific programming area rather than being integrated into a broader range of programming in fragile contexts. As a result, women’s representation in Canadian foreign policy in the field is limited to their roles as victims of sexual and gender-based violence and as mothers.89 While these are important aspects of some women’s experiences in conflict and development that need to be addressed, such an approach fails to promote other identities and roles for women in post-conflict settings, which can reinforce problematic power dynamics and perpetuate instability.

The consideration of gender in Canadian Fragile States Policy is largely limited to the Canadian National Action Plan for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP). The approach articulated in C-NAP is centred on promoting equality between women and men and protecting women’s rights. It includes provisions for “the deliberate engagement of women, including indigenous women, in bodies that are able to make binding decisions, or indeed the devolution of decision making authority to existing venues, statutory and non-statutory, where women historically have enjoyed greater influence.”90 The objectives of C-NAP include the participation of women in peacebuilding processes, the promotion and protection of the rights of women and girls, improving the capacity of Canadian personnel in preventing violence, and protecting the rights of women and girls, promoting a relief approach that takes into account the differing experiences of women, men, boys and girls, and holding the managers of peace operations to account for upholding UN Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Development. Yet, C-NAP does not contain any provisions for

mainstreaming gender equality or even women, peace and security considerations into broader Canadian FCAS programming. In this way, it diverges significantly from DFATD’s Policy on Gender Equality,91 which was originally developed for CIDA but has now been integrated into DFATD. Although this may be the intention of a program run by the Strategic Reconstruction Taskforce that trains Canadian officials working in FCAS on the topics covered by UNSCR 1325,92 it fails to ensure that the unique experiences of men and women in conflict are approached differently than in other development contexts in addition to essentializing women as victims as suggested by Tiessen.93 This also creates the impression that gender equality is not considered to be a factor in FCAS programming outside of specialized programs under this very narrow theme. This failure to address gender equality and to mainstream it does not reflect broader Canadian commitments such as Canada’s Policy on Gender Equality.

The only other area of Canadian foreign policy that discusses gender in relation to state fragility is the Women, Peace and Security thematic priority under the Strategic Reconstruction Taskforce. The policy statements publicly available through START broadly reflect the language of C-NAP. It is worth noting that despite this connection, only 42% of START deployments of civilians to fragile and conflict-affected situations received training on the different impact of armed conflict on women and girls.94 Furthermore, START has limited impact or potential given its relationship to the government. START has essentially been sidelined since 2014 which is part of what they view as a complete abandonment of FCAS by the current government.95

A review of projects funded by DFATD conducted in May 2015 suggests that the trend toward addressing women’s needs through a narrowly defined policy is also being implemented in development programming in FCAS. Using the International Development Project Browser to search for the term “women” in operational projects in Canada’s five priority countries that are fragile or conflict-affected, including Haiti, Afghanistan, the West Bank and Gaza, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan,96 reveals a handful of projects

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94 M. Nobert (2014).
specifically promoting the empowerment of women, while the majority list women as passive beneficiaries, often among men, women and children.97

Overall, there were seventy-three project descriptions in FCAS in the DFATD database that contained the search term “women.” Of these, twenty-one were in Haiti, seventeen were in Afghanistan, sixteen were in South Sudan, ten were in the DRC and nine were in West Bank/ Gaza. The country descriptions for both Afghanistan and Haiti identify either “gender equality” or “equality between women and men” as priorities in the country programs, while the other country descriptions address women and gender in a more indirect way. Given this observation, it is unsurprising Haiti and Afghanistan have more than twice the number of projects where the description includes the word “women” than both the DRC and the West Bank combined. However this indicates that there is a pronounced discrepancy in addressing women and gender between countries of focus.

Projects were searched from all seven sectors of DFATD. Twenty-one were under the heading of emergency assistance, twenty-six were listed under improving basic health, eight were listed under democratic governance, three projects focused on private sector development and one project sought to strengthen basic education. Two sectors that did not yield any results were peace and security and the environment, although some projects in these domains may occur at the regional level. In total, approximately twenty-four of the projects reviewed significantly diverged from narratives presenting women as victims and mothers and took a more emancipatory approach rooted in a Gender Equality framework. They tended to focus on democratic engagement, creating economic opportunities, and legal and institutional reforms in the justice and security sectors. These projects were most highly represented in Haiti and Afghanistan.

In contrast, essentializing language referring to women as mothers, victims or beneficiaries was most prevalent in the sectors focused on emergency assistance and improving basic health. Women were often referred to as beneficiaries in these projects, along with children or men, women and children as a cohesive group. While the projects that target the needs of “men, women and children” may reflect the language of “equality between women and men,” they fail to recognize the different experiences of conflict and crisis that occur within and between these groups. It is clear that such projects are not designed to address problematic power dynamics and inequality between women and men.

Finally, although this search yielded only seventy-three results, a subsequent search of operational projects in these five countries without the term “women” yields more than five hundred results. This suggests that considerations of the different experiences in both development and conflict between women and men may be absent or poorly defined in the majority of the projects undertaken in these states. The term “gender” rarely appeared in the project descriptions and results, except when describing gender-based and sexual violence, gender-sensitive health care (Afghanistan), gender-specific latrines and in the context of Afghanistan’s country description, in relation to Canada’s efforts with other multilateral actors. A search for the term “gender” in the database yields no results.

These findings suggest that development projects in FCAS are applying principles of gender equality unevenly. The discrepancy in the approach to gender equality, which is demonstrated between projects specifically targeting women’s empowerment in democratic governance and the private sector with those in emergency assistance and improving basic health, demonstrates that gender analysis and equality principles are not being mainstreamed in these projects. Instead, they are being well applied in projects specifically targeting women, and at best, references to women are being included as an afterthought if at all in broader projects. Without a strong policy foundation for an approach to gender in these states, it is impossible to identify a baseline at which gender should be addressed in these projects, which will result in gender equality principles being applied inconsistently, leading to uneven development and state-building results.

Examining projects across the five FCAS countries of focus identified by DFATD provides a broad understanding of general trends in development practice. By considering one of the cases in depth, it is possible to gain a more full understanding of how gender factors into programming in these states.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo was the most recent FCAS addition to the list of priority countries. Documents obtained through an Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) request suggest that gender is primarily being discussed in relation to projects specifically addressing women’s needs, such as efforts to address high rates of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). Project documents from these areas demonstrate strong gender analysis and an empowerment-centred approach geared toward providing new economic opportunities for victims of SGBV, as well as improved access to justice and legal and medical services. In addition, projects in this area also consider the different experiences of both men and women in conflict. However, a forthcoming study conducted by Tiessen and Hartviksen suggests that these considerations are not being applied to other programming areas, particularly artisanal mining, which is a major programming area for DFATD. The failure to include gender considerations in broader programming areas was also reflected in the failure of an ATIP request on the terms “gender equality for women in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” to yield results beyond documents pertaining to SGBV. In order to address inequality between women and men in the DRC, women need to be empowered and consulted in actions addressing all of the domains in which they work and live.

These trends within programming suggest that while DFATD does have the capacity for strong gender analysis and programming focused on the empowerment of women to participate in political and economic activities, such efforts are being limited either by narrowly defined policy or as a result of a lack of political will from the outgoing Conservative government.

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These observations lead to two conclusions. First, the overview of operational projects in the five fragile countries of priority suggests that the government is making some effort to implement gender programming in these states. When considered alongside Canada’s commitment to Women, Peace and Security, it begins to appear as though a narrowly defined set of gender and women’s issues are emerging as a specific area of policy and practice in Canada’s approach to international affairs. This sort of focused programming has the potential to support transformative results in which specific gaps in a country’s policy or legal frameworks are addressed through peacebuilding or statebuilding efforts. However, the outcome of such projects is dependent on the consideration of women and gender dynamics outside of such projects, as well as defining women’s roles in fragile and conflict settings beyond simply as mothers and victims.

Second, this review also demonstrates that gender is not being effectively mainstreamed into Canadian policy and practice in FCAS. This is evident through the lack of discussion of gender equality principles in Canadian policy documents on FCAS, the small number of operational development projects funded by the government, and the failure to effectively integrate gender equality into development programming in the ASM sector in the DRC.

This has three implications for Canadian programming in FCAS. First, this approach is likely to lead to uneven development results between men and women as a result of the failure to mainstream gender considerations across FCAS programming. Second, this approach essentializes women in a way that fails to acknowledge the diverse experiences of men and women both as active and passive actors in conflict settings, and fails to challenge the power dynamics that need to be addressed in order to promote sustainable empowerment for both men and women. Finally, this approach reinforces the discourse that applies masculine attributes to state fragility and failure and views men as the only potential active actors in such contexts. Thus, reflecting on Paducel and Salahub’s observation on the failure to implement gender equality as part of policy and practice in FCAS, the current approach being adopted through Canadian Foreign Policy threatens to weaken both development and security outcomes in these states.\(^\text{100}\)

A more effective approach would be to broaden the range of gender-specific programming to address gender-related power imbalances among both women and men, as well as mainstreaming gender within all Canadian programming in FCAS. Such an approach would acknowledge the diverse roles that men and women play in both conflict and post-conflict settings and seek to support them through a variety of experiences, through targeted programming such as those that already exist addressing sexual and gender-based violence and maternal, newborn and child health. Mainstreaming gender throughout Canada’s foreign policy in FCAS would ensure that programming, including the development of new institutions, would not perpetuate problematic power relations based on gender. It would also avoid the perpetuation of the application of gendered language and norms to war and peace.


\url{http://dl.dropbox.com/u/41702390/PaducelandSalahubGEinFS.pdf}
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Part 2 – Looking Forward
Bridging the Gap between Conflict Minerals and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Doris Buss


In 2010, the US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to regulate the ‘too big to fail’ banks and the fallout of the 2008 global economic collapse. At the end of this lengthy statute, under the heading ‘miscellaneous’ is section 1502, an extraordinary provision requiring corporations that use any amount of tin, tantalum, tungsten or gold in their manufactured products to make annual public reports about the origins of the minerals used, if they might originate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or its neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes region. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) is highlighted in the preamble to s. 1502 as a rationale for the provision, noting a link between SGBV and the “exploitation and trade of conflict minerals” in financing conflict.

Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank is part of a global governance trend toward highly technical self-reporting requirements for corporations working in the extractives sector. Section 1502 unfolded alongside The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and has been followed by a May 2015 European Parliament resolution that follows a similar path.101 There is now in place a significant global governance apparatus, the ostensible aims of which include building state stability, ending armed conflict, fostering economic development, and ending patterns of extreme sexual and gender-based violence and other human rights abuses. Section 1502, with its statutory-based reporting requirement and its broad reach to all US companies listed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, is the sharp end of this new trend. It has generated a flurry of activity by companies and NGOs, scholars and activists to regulate the production and trade in tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold (known as 3TGs), producing, in turn, a new growth industry in the devices and techniques needed to monitor a global, complex 3TGs supply chain.

The implications of the regulation of conflict minerals for women are multiple, but three in particular stand out for their connection to the obligations outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 1325. First, sexual and gender-based violence is listed as a justification for conflict mineral regulation and there is now a push for more monitoring and investigation of the link between mineral extraction, conflict and sexual and gender-based violence,

which aligns with the requirements of UNSC 1325 to gather information on SGBV. Second, Dodd-Frank and the broader governance shift it signals are framed as necessary for conflict amelioration, and yet have unfolded without the participation of women in the affected regions and without adequate follow-up of the impacts on women. Finally, conflict minerals regulation has generated new laws and governance arrangements in which gender is absent in design but not in effect.

Conflict minerals regulation is largely directed at the black market trade in 3TGs produced through artisanal mining, which is defined in turn by its rudimentary techniques, high rates of manual labour, a higher than normal source of income (compared to other livelihood options), and a willing workforce often drawn from populations displaced from the regular economy (because of conflict, violence, economic crises and so on). It is, in short, an important source of livelihood for those who have endured years of conflict in the Great Lakes region. An estimated 3.7 million people in Africa are directly engaged in artisanal mining with 30 million dependent upon it, and women are estimated to comprise 40-50% of workers in mining zones, though in some areas this can be as high as 90%.

The potential impact of conflict minerals regulation on livelihoods became apparent in 2010 when DRC President Joseph Kabila temporarily halted all mining activity in two eastern provinces, a move some commentators attribute to the passage of s. 1502 and the corresponding international scrutiny. The result was devastating for the already precarious lives of tens of thousands of Congolese. Mining eventually resumed (in 2011), and many NGOs and Congolese are now working to ensure stability in livelihoods through, among other things, supply chain certification schemes. The question of what, if any, positive impact conflict minerals regulation has on peace and security in the region is subject to ongoing debate and conflicting research. What is painfully apparent in this debate is the almost complete absence of gender analysis and of the voices and participation of women from the mining communities. While efforts are underway to formalize a DRC women’s civil society movement engaging in mining issues, grassroots women are consistently absent from the places where decisions are being made about them and their livelihoods, even when those decisions are being made in the name of women’s security.

A central obligation from UN Security Council Resolution 1325 is the equal participation of women and men, and the promotion of gender equality in peace and security decision-

making processes at the national, local, regional and international levels. Conflict mineral governance has generated new systems, reporting and decision-making arenas that have as one of their aims the amelioration of conflict and the fostering of security. To comply with UNSC 1325, and indeed to ensure its own effectiveness, the emerging global regime on conflict-affected resource extraction needs to ensure that grassroots women’s groups are involved in decision-making about how and by what terms mineral production and trade are regulated.

The gathering and monitoring of information on conflict-related (sexual) violence against women and girls is another obligation clearly outlined in UNSC 1325. This needs to be complied with, I would argue, not just by monitoring incidences of sexual violence, but also by tracking how conflict amelioration strategies and interventions, such as conflict minerals regulation, are themselves impacting on sexual and gender-based violence. Some early research on women’s livelihoods in artisanal mines in eastern DRC suggests that the certification of mining sites (as green, yellow or red flagged) has had gendered effects, one example of which is the ban on pregnant women from green flagged sites. This requirement has been interpreted in some cases to ban all women from the mine site, at least formally. Researchers, however, have seen women still working in these ‘no women’ mines, suggesting that these women paid a significant price to continue working.¹⁰⁵ New licensing requirements instituted to comply with mineral tracing raise similar concerns. Women are likely to lack the finances, mobility and literacy needed to secure a license, meaning that they are rendered even more vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. These two examples suggest that the increased formalization of mining required by conflict minerals regulation may have the unintended effect of increasing some women’s vulnerability.

At a minimum, a systematic gender analysis of the parameters and effects of conflict minerals regulation needs to be undertaken. While new studies on sexual violence in DRC, and in relation to mining, are beginning to emerge, the remote and difficult terrain in eastern DRC makes data collection difficult. The study and monitoring of violence and human rights abuses in and surrounding mining communities need to continue, with more attention to the interrelationship between economic, political and physical insecurity over a period of time. (Full disclosure: I am part of a team of researchers conducting an analysis with similar objectives, of women and artisanal mining in DRC, Uganda and Rwanda.¹⁰⁶ My point here is that more research is needed, different from what I am involved in, to uncover

¹⁰⁶ For more information, see http://carleton.ca/africanstudies/research/artisanal-mining-and-gender-in-sub-saharan-africaexploitation-miniere-artisanale-et-le-genre/
the complex operations of insecurity, and the effects of international interventions in the name of peace and security).

A third strand of UNSC 1325 and the women, peace and security agenda implicated in conflict minerals regulation is law reform and access to justice for women, a theme that is particularly relevant to Canadian policy. Rule of law is generally identified as relevant to women and girls as a recourse following a rights violation. Most programming in this vein focuses on increasing women’s access to criminal courts for justice in the case of sexual violence. But the components of UNSC 1325, I would argue, can be read to invite a richer approach, one that would consider the gendered dimensions of mining law, for example, as well as other seemingly ‘gender-neutral’ areas of post-conflict law reform (such as tax reform, property rights, etc). The wave of mining law reforms in the Great Lakes region, for example, often enacted to comply with conflict minerals requirements, is being conducted largely without any effort to mainstream gender, despite the obligations under UNSC 1325, as well as regional guidance on this issue.107

**Implications for Canada’s National Action Plan**

Canada is well poised to take a leadership role in bridging the gap between the women, peace and security agenda and the new governance architecture on conflict minerals. Canada has been an active participant in the development of the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines, it chairs the OECD forum on responsible mineral supply chains as well as the Multi-Stakeholder Steering Group, and it has funded mineral governance initiatives as well as justice initiatives for victims of SGBV, to name a few. From this vantage, Canada is well positioned to connect the conflict minerals regime and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This could be done, to begin, by using Canada’s national action plan to provide a more fulsome review of the many ways in which Canadian trade, development and foreign policy components are involved in supporting improved governance of the extractives sector, followed by an analysis of how these efforts align with the obligations under UNSCR 1325.

*My thanks to Sarah Katz-Lavigne for reading and commenting on a draft of this article.*
This year was a tricky one, with Canadian elections looming and the polls without a clear picture of who would be leading this country for the next four years. In the aftermath of the election, with the Liberals winning a majority, there is an opportunity to make great changes to the funding of sexual violence in conflict projects.

There is great potential in the actions the past Government of Canada is presently undertaking. For example, consider the move to fund an independent external review of claims of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment within the Canadian Armed Forces. This could be an exceptional initiative, considering the report released earlier this year to much excitement and fanfare, which set out the extent of the problem.108

The concern of this activist, however, is the depth of the external review, the strength of its outcomes and the willingness to introduce necessary changes to address the problem of sexual misconduct and sexual harassment within the Canadian Armed Forces. Tossing out a few recommendations, no matter how good they are, is pointless without follow-through, and follow-through is ineffective without changes to the institutional structures and culture required to make such changes long-lasting.

This also requires a shift in attitude of the governmental body pushing for such change. To date, the Canadian government has largely looked the other way as an increasing number of reports came forward of inappropriate, sexist and masochistic behaviours of certain members of the Canadian Armed Forces. If we are going to start changing how we approach the issue of sexual violence and conflict, it must start at home, and it must start with increased funding for training and programs for the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as a strong position than anything less than zero tolerance for sexual misconduct and sexual harassment will be dealt with swiftly and clearly.

Another clear example of potential that just misses the mark is the Government of Canada’s commitment to and support of UN Security Council Resolutions. On the surface, this might seem to be an excellent idea: UN Security Council Resolutions have been powerful and strong declarations of acceptable behaviours during peace and wartime, and the series of UN Security Council Resolutions on sexual violence and conflict in particular has been key to the development and expansion of programming on the prevention and treatment of the crime.

Like so many things though, blind support in name and spirit are meaningless without strong actions and, yes, funding to back up that support. There are a few key projects that jump out in the 2013-2014 report that raise red flags, issues that should be addressed for

the next Canadian government if they want to say that they truly stand for the elimination of sexual violence in conflict.

The first of these issues is Canada’s funding, along with Spain, of a Gender Advisor for OCHA in the West Bank and Gaza. Now, let us start by saying that this is a required position, which hopefully brought a great deal of gender mainstreaming and knowledge to an important conflict. However, it is the fact that there is just one position, funded only partially, in one organisation for one conflict that raises some confusion.

Why fund just a one-off position that—regardless of whether this is the most incredible Gender Advisor in the humanitarian world—realistically will have a limited effect, long-term? Instead of investing that money in one individual, it should have been invested in programming that more directly affects the local community, for example through one of Palestine’s many local NGOs, or even through partnership with an INGO on the ground, as opposed to the “overall humanitarian community” in the West Bank and Gaza. A noble effort, but one that just misses the mark of effective means of helping women and girls in conflict.

The second issue noted is the recognition of the need to support the posting of female protection advisors in UN Peacekeeping operations where sexual violence is widespread. In spite of the fact that the Canadian government rightly recognises that this is a problem worth addressing and supporting, it fails to do so. In fact, the 2013-2014 report states “Canada contributed to its commitment to women’s leadership by actively supporting the Special Representative of the Secretary General to MINUSTAH (Haiti) Sandra Honoré since her May 2013 appointment.” That is it.

Our support of Special Representative Honoré is fantastic, and women in leadership positions should be supported. Failure to actively participate in the advocacy and funding for female protection advisors, however, results in more empty words with nothing to back them up – the essence of the Canadian government’s support for sexual violence in conflict initiatives at the moment. The gap between promises and action is leaving many women and girls behind, and giving the impression that Canada is little more than a mouth box.

The final issue has been raised in the media throughout the last year. The Government of Canada provides funding for sexual violence in conflict services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, services that provide essential healthcare for survivors of sexual violence. This health care helps to reduce the spread of HIV, AIDS and STIs. It helps survivors to heal, so that they begin to form new lives. It helps to bring families and communities back together. It has an incredible effect on the recovery of the country.

“If we are going to start changing how we approach the issue of sexual violence and conflict, it must start at home, and it must start with increased funding for training and programs for the Canadian Armed Forces, as well as a strong position than anything less than zero tolerance for sexual misconduct and sexual harassment will be dealt with swiftly and clearly.”
However, there is a glaring omission in the care funded by the Canadian government. This money, which is essential and worthy funding, specifically will not fund abortions. This exclusion, while not entirely eliminating the overall effect of the rest of the funding, does result in an incredible gap for survivors of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Religious arguments should be irrelevant in this kind of scenario. A legal medical procedure is denied to these survivors of sexual violence. Women and young girls are forced to either carry the children of their rapists, resulting in long-term mental and emotional issues, not to mention having to raise the children of said rapists or contributing to the growing number of children living in orphanages, or obtain unsafe abortions that can place their health at risk. This should be the clearest and easiest solution in the world – placing this restriction on our funding of sexual health services in the Democratic Republic of the Congo places women and girls at risk. It is genuinely that simple, and I would suggest it is the first change that should be made to our funding post 19 October.

I could go on, highlighting additional concerns about how Canada is funding sexual violence projects, if only there was the space to do so. Suffice it to say that these are illustrations of underlying themes exhibited by the current Canadian government’s funding of projects on sexual violence in conflict – many words without the action or (appropriate and responsive) funding to back them up.

Canada was, once upon a time, a leader in humanitarian intervention, and on women, peace and security in particular. Our actions abroad were something for Canada’s citizens to be proud of, and I yearn for the day that we can do that once again.

If Canada wants to resume its place in international development, humanitarian aid and foreign policy, if it wants to be a country Canadians can be proud of again, that should start with how and what we fund for projects on sexual violence in conflict. A thorough examination needs to be made of our priorities – starting with a look at home and then going abroad.

With a Liberal majority, we now have in our hands the opportunity to begin again.
Improving Cross-sectoral Collaboration on Gender, Security and Development (Reflections on Past Practice and Future Opportunities)

Rebecca Tiessen

Introduction

Among the many titles I considered for this contribution to Looking Back, Looking Forward was We All Have Something to Bring to the Table: Why Scholars, Civil Society Practitioners and Government Staff/Policy Makers Need a New Approach for Ending Isolationism in Canadian Efforts to Promote Gender Equality. While not a particularly catchy or succinct title, it captured quite well the key arguments that I am making in this short paper. Let me begin by noting that the contributions – and the initiatives – of civil society actors in demanding a space at the table with government officials (those responsible for drafting Canadian commitments and preparing/circulating Canadian reports on Women, Peace and Security initiatives) are remarkable. There are times when civil society actors are invited to contribute to government processes and times when NGOs and civil society members have insisted that their voices be heard. Nonetheless, the manner in which ‘consultation’ between government and civil society takes place is ad hoc, and such opportunities (since 2006) have dwindled. Finding ways for different stakeholders to collaborate regularly and meaningfully on a range of Canadian national matters, including Canada’s commitments to women/gender, peace and security is difficult, but essential, and is not limited to civil society actors and government workers.

In this paper, I argue for a stronger collaboration between a larger set of stakeholders to include (more regularly) academics and scholars in the discussions and commitments on gender, security and development. Participation of scholars in a number of civil society activities and networks exists: witness the contributions to this collection and the previous publication, Worth the Wait? Academics and scholars have actively communicated with other stakeholders in the women/gender, peace and security discussions. Again, these contributions are also inconsistent and limited.

My starting point for this paper is therefore a recognition that we are all (as Canadians) responsible for Canada’s improved commitments to women/gender, peace and security and that therefore we need a better, more structured and institutionalized communication process between diverse stakeholders in the promotion of women/gender, peace and security. In building this case, I summarize the current state of cross-sector communication and collaboration on gender equality and offer rationales for improved co-operation across sectors.109 I also use this opportunity to share some of the insights I have gained through

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109 I draw heavily on research and a series of articles and book chapters I have written on this subject over the past two years. I provide references to those publications for additional information. If you would like to receive a copy of any or all of these publications, please send me an email: rtiessen@uottawa.ca
my research and observations as an academic who is committed to collaboration with – and learning from – diverse stakeholders committed to gender equality.

**The Canadian Context: Challenges and Opportunities**

It is useful to begin with a discussion of the challenges to Canada’s efforts to promote gender equality between 2006 and 2015, as this analysis sets the stage for a better understanding of why cross-sector communication has been so difficult. Four key characteristics define the gender equality context in Canada between 2006 and 2015: the discursive shift and erasure of gender equality and its implications for communication about gender issues within and across sectors, the Harper Conservatives’ tight leash on government staff and their limited opportunities for sharing ideas outside of government, the Harper Conservatives dislike of scientific scholarship and those who “commit sociology”, and mutual distrust across sectors deepened by the three preceding points.

The shift in the language from ‘gender equality’ to ‘equality between women and men’ (see Tiessen and Carrier, 2015) marked an important turning point for how programs on gender equality were to be implemented and reported on. Interviews with government staff to better understand the implications of this shift in language in their day-to-day work underscored mixed results (see Tiessen, 2014a). Some government staff members continued to push for gender equality in their programs but recognized that reporting language had to be altered to reflect the new discursive approach adopted by the Harper Conservatives (see Tiessen, 2014b). Over time, we have seen a gradual return of the language of gender equality in official government documents. However, the change in language created both perceived and real challenges for implementing effective and cohesive gender equality programs. One such example is the delay in the production of the Canadian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, which reportedly was stalled due to editorial changes involving the removal of references to gender equality in the document (see Tiessen 2015a).

With an emphasis on women’s issues such as maternal health and girls’ issues, such as early and forced child marriage, the Harper government took a new, and superficial, approach to women’s and girls’ issues (see Tiessen, 2015b). It may be obvious to many, but it bears repeating that the language of inequality between women and men (rather than gender inequality) speaks to a (potentially purposeful) dismissal on the part of the Harper government of transgender groups that do not identify as either women or men. Nonetheless, gender equality commitments on the whole were curtailed.

The restrictions on gender equality obligations were not limited to foreign policy activities. In December 2014 when Peter Mansbridge asked Stephen Harper about his plans for an inquiry into the missing and murdered indigenous women, Prime Minister (PM) Harper...
responded that this was not high on the government’s radar. Clearly, he was referring to the inquiry itself – an inquiry that was not considered a pressing issue. However, his comment suggested a general dismissal of issues pertaining to the widespread violence against – and disappearance of – Aboriginal women in Canada. Gender equality, it is clear, was not high on the Harper Conservative government’s radar and the tokenistic, instrumentalist and essentializing approaches promoted over this nine-year period demonstrate that (see Tiessen and Carrier, 2015).

In conducting interviews with (past and present) government officials with some gender expertise, I was hoping to learn more about the challenges they experienced under the Harper Conservatives in terms of promoting gender equality. Findings from those interviews are presented in several of the publications noted in the bibliography. It was notable, however, how difficult it was to get government officials to speak to me. I had obtained ethics approval to conduct these interviews and had followed all necessary precautions to inform potential interview participants that anonymity would be guaranteed and that no references to names, positions, etc., would be included in the reporting or publications. Pseudonyms were chosen and gender-neutral names were used to reduce any possibility of identifying the interviewee. Yet, in spite of these measures, very few government officials were willing (or able) to participate in this study. Some of the potential interview participants said quite candidly that they did not want to be associated with any studies that might be deemed critical of the Conservative government. I had greater success in the interviews with people who had left government positions and were able to speak more openly about their experiences – some of them claimed to have left government positions because of the muzzling of staff members on issues like gender equality and the newly implemented women’s initiatives.

Earlier in 2014, PM Harper commented that he refused to ‘commit sociology.’ This was a fascinating comment for scholars and practitioners alike to ponder, largely because it explains so well the challenges we have observed under the Harper Conservative governments in relation to the promotion of gender equality. At the core of this comment about ‘committing sociology’ is a desire to focus on issues that can be solved with simple solutions rather than tackling the root problems of inequality that perpetuate a range of society-wide challenges, including gender inequality, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), the intersection between racism and gender inequality, and other structural and cultural factors that perpetuate violence and inequality. This perspective on ‘committing sociology’ applied to Harper’s stance on addressing a VIA rail terrorist plot but extends also to his approach to – or dismissal of – issues pertaining to missing and murdered Aboriginal women. Other ways that the Harper Conservatives have rejected scientific and sociological research include closing scientific libraries across the country, cutting funding to government-supported research programs and eliminating long-form census data collection. All of these scientific and sociological resources were central to asking ‘why’ questions rather than just ‘what’ questions. For the Harper Conservatives, determining the nature of the problem was quickly linked, in many cases, to criminal behaviour and

110 I want to thank Krystel Carrier (now Chapman) for her hard work reaching out prospective interviewees and for conducting the interviews in support of my research.
building new prisons – and then filling them – and this became the default solution to societal problems.

One of the impacts of this perspective on superficial approaches to societal problems was a growing mutual distrust between different sectors. Government staff members under the Harper Conservatives rarely sought out perspectives from the scholarly community, though the history of policy/scholar relations in Canada has always been weak. The distrust extended also to the civil society organization and non-governmental organization (CSO/NGO) communities and government staff, who have both noted deepened divisions in communications across the sectors.

In interviews conducted with CSO staff members in Canada, we¹¹¹ uncovered some important observations from the CSO staff members’ perspectives on the nature and extent of the growing divide between government officials and non-governmental activists. Nearly every individual interviewed (11 out of 12 people interviewed) said that there was a growing distrust between CSOs and government under the Harper Conservatives: a distrust that has a longer history than the Conservative regimes but has indeed intensified in the past nine years. The challenge to communication, as noted by CSO members, was in line with a perception of CSO staff members acting as government critics. Thus, a silencing of dissent – of voices who may question why the Harper Conservative government has taken a particular approach or failed to understand deeper societal, structural and systemic reasons for injustice – became a pervasive element in government-NGO relations.

To summarize then the current state of cross-sector communication on gender equality in Canada, it is important to understand the context in which this communication has (or has not) taken place. The climate has not been conducive to cross-sector communication and the sharing of ideas, in part because the objectives of the Harper Conservatives do not lend themselves well to the kinds of conversations generated through cross-sector communication: reflection on systemic, structural and deep-rooted causes of gender inequality (masculinities, gendered institutions, cultural norms, etc.) and reflecting on the solutions to the symptomatic issues such as early and forced marriage for girls, or maternal death. It is noteworthy, however, that Canada has not historically had a particularly vibrant communication strategy to ensure collaborative efforts among scholars, practitioners and policy-makers (see Smillie and Tiessen, forthcoming). However, these challenges, particularly in terms of the promotion of gender equality, have diminished under the Harper Conservative governments. Yet, cross-sector communication and collaboration offers much needed depth and reflection for addressing equality-related issues and transformative gender mainstreaming (see Tiessen and Tuckey, 2015) and I turn to the prospects for a (re)new(ed) commitment to mutual learning and collaborative programming opportunities.

¹¹¹ I wish to thank Sara Walde for her contributions to my research project on “Promoting Gender Equality in Canada”. Sara assisted me with this research by contacting and interviewing 12 members of CSO organizations as part of my project. Some of the data collected will also be used by Sara in writing her Master’s Major Research Paper.
Rationales for Better Collaboration across Sectors

Several rationales for improved collaboration across sectors are identified in this section. It is worth noting that my vantage point is limited. I have only observed certain interactions, attended specific meetings, read certain documents and examined particular issues. I am limited by time constraints and an inability to have a bird’s eye of the broad range of collaborations that exist. Many existing collaborations are noteworthy and I return to this in the next section, as they offer examples of effective practices to be examined in our efforts for scaling up. Though my observations are inherently limited, I have devoted some time to trying to understand the nature and extent of the broad range of contributions of three core sectors (government, civil society and academia) to the promotion of gender, security and development, and I have done so through research projects involving interviews with government staff and staff members, analyses of government documents, access to information (ATIP requests), and observations of meetings and workshops where different stakeholders have come together to discuss issues pertaining to gender, security and development.

A quick survey of scholarly material on feminist and/or gender studies of security issues highlights the wealth of academic insight, scholarly research and useful data and analysis on a large number of case studies around the world. These materials, however, are sometimes written in a language accessible only to certain (scholarly) communities, published in inaccessible journals that only university students and professors can access, presented at conferences attended primarily by other scholars, and/or published in expensive books with scholarly audiences in mind. There is much value in the scholarly material produced as it has moved feminist theoretical thinking forward in important ways, and has enriched the field of gender studies with careful, ethically sound research and case studies. However, the communication of this material to audiences outside academia is often limited, and perilously so.

Government program reports offer rich insights into the kinds of programs in place, the capacity of the government to address a range of gender equality issues and an evaluation of successes and failures. However, these documents are often not easily accessible. ATIP requests can take a long time, and government staff members are seldom in a position to speak publicly (and critically) about the kinds of programs implemented and their results. NGO and CSO staff members work long hours, tirelessly seeking out funding needed to address the immediate and long-term needs of those facing gendered insecurity. Their reports are often tailored to the financial requirements of donors, and there are no real incentives or processes for sharing this information with a diverse audience.

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112 I am grateful to the University of Ottawa, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council and the Canada Research Chairs Program for providing funding to carry out this research and to employ research assistants including Krystel Chapman, Sara Walde, Ashley Ramier and Sarah Tuckey between 2010 and 2015.

113 I am implicated in this process of producing inaccessible material on gender, security and development. There are distinct reasons for doing so in terms of career contributions as a scholar but I have made some effort to reach a broad audience through blog posts, non-academic workshops and report contributions like this one.
Yet, collectively these three sectors could benefit immensely from greater communication and collaboration. My observations and discussions with members from all three sectors suggest that there is a demonstrated desire to engage in greater communication across sectors and that important – though infrequent – strategies have been employed through networking meetings on Women, Peace and Security matters, among other networks. There is, therefore, great potential for – and openness to – improved dialogue. The dialogue exists between what we might refer to as ’insider activists’ or those committed to the promotion of gender equality as well as individuals dedicated to learning from diverse actors in pursuit of this goal. Such a commitment does not necessarily exist for all scholars and/or policy-makers and government staff, and reaching a broader audience is imperative, particularly with an audience comprising leadership and decision-making roles. So while there is potential, and even some good examples of existing practice, there is much room for expansion. Several important conclusions emerge from my observations, which I address in the final section of the paper. These conclusions are meant to inform a future process for improved communication within Canada in our efforts to promote a new vision for Women/Gender Peace and Security.

**Concluding Thoughts and Wishful Thinking**

There are deep divisions between the government, NGO/CSO and academic sectors that have prevented communication and collaboration on gender, security and development work. These divisions and communication gaps have been exacerbated under the Harper Conservative governments between 2006 and 2015. In this paper, I have provided an examination of the broader context within Canada in explaining the reasons for the deep and growing divisions across sectors. These divisions can be explained, in part, by an important shift in the official terminology employed to address official government business on gender equality and the way that discursive shift translated into practices, reporting, and a silencing of dissent within government agencies. The shift in language corresponded with increasingly muzzled government staff and their limited opportunities for sharing ideas outside of government, as well as the Harper Conservatives’ dislike for – and belittling of – scientific scholarship and sociological analysis, and a perception of mutual distrust across sectors.

These challenges, however, need to be understood within the broader context of a range of actors, some who remained committed to gender equality and to collaboration with colleagues across sectors (insider activists) and the temporary nature of any particular government. There are a wealth of opportunities awaiting those committed to the promotion of gender, security and development nationally in the form of new policy directions and renewed conversations in a post-2015 election environment.

Internationally, opportunities exist for Canada’s external role participating on international conferences, designing and promoting global campaigns and partnering with organizations and nations around the world in an effort to ensure gender, security and development.

Forging new relationships and building stronger coalitions with others committed to gender, security and development – and gender equality more broadly – is essential to our efforts to understand the causes of gender inequality and insecurity. Feminist scholarship
and analysis of masculinities (see Parpart and Zalewski, 1998; and Tiessen, Parpart and Marchand, forthcoming), for example, offer one important strategy for understanding how and why sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) persists and the reasons why women continue to be excluded from decision-making or post-conflict leadership roles. My appeal is for greater collaboration across the sectors, and my contribution to these discussions is as a scholar dedicated to understanding the reasons for gendered insecurities and women’s marginalization in conflict and post-conflict contexts. The rationale for collaboration is clear: each sector brings valuable knowledge and insights to addressing gender, peace and security. However, conversations about how to work collaboratively as scholars, practitioners and policy-makers are needed now more than ever.

**For Additional Information:**


http://doi.org/0.1177/0020702014564799


http://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.977310


Conclusion

Beth Woroniuk and Sara Walde

Canada’s current National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (C-NAP) expires in March 2016. This provides an excellent opportunity to take stock, learn from the current NAP, and develop a new and improved Action Plan. A new NAP could be the basis for stronger Canadian actions and investments in support of WPS objectives.

Since October 2010 and the launch of the C-NAP, some progress has been made. The Government reports that the strongest areas of Canadian action have been advocacy and policy dialogue on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict situations.\(^{114}\) They note increased attention to gender analysis in projects funded by the Global Peace and Security Fund, as well as an increase in the number and percentage of gender-equality-specific projects funded by the same Fund. The progress reports include anecdotal examples of projects funded, assurances that training programs incorporate women, peace and security issues, and data on the increasing participation by women in Canada’s international police deployment. Although weaknesses remain in the structure and nature of the progress reports, there have been some improvements.

The mid-term review conducted by the Institute for Inclusive Security notes that institutional change in DFATD has been sparked by the C-NAP.\(^{115}\) Their research suggests that attitudes and behaviours amongst Government of Canada staff regarding WPS issues are beginning to shift due to internal structures and accountability processes that, in part, the C-NAP requires.

As of November 2015, there have been two government–civil society meetings on WPS issues – the first in February, hosted by START, and the second in June, hosted by the WPSN-C. These meetings have been productive exchanges of information and priorities.

However, major issues remain. This compilation of reflections outlines many issues. Civil society has expressed concerns that the NAP does not function as a guiding document that influences policy choices and funding directions. This was confirmed by the Inclusive Security review, which concluded that the “C-NAP is not widely considered to be a policy directive.” In other words, the “C-NAP is perceived as not significantly influencing Canada’s overall policy direction with respect to conflict-affected and fragile states.”\(^{116}\) So while the C-NAP reports include examples of specific initiatives related to the WPS agenda, Canada’s overall approach to conflict-affected countries does not appear to have women’s rights as a core guiding principle. It seems that policy makers have not taken on board the basic

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insight that gender inequalities, women’s rights and gender issues are central factors in both the aggravation of armed conflict and its resolution.

Civil society has raised numerous issues regarding past policy directions, including the failure of the Government of Canada to fund the full range of reproductive health services, the failure to sign the Arms Trade Treaty, the lack of funding going to grassroots women’s organizations, the absence of a dedicated budget for the NAP, only minimal support for women’s participation in peace processes, the focus on women’s vulnerability rather than supporting them as actors, and so on. Questions have been asked about issues that are not currently in the C-NAP.117

Other concerns raised by this set of reflections and the earlier Worth the Wait? report include tardy and unclear reporting on the C-NAP, lack of transparency on the allocation of financial resources, inadequate analysis of the indicators, as well as problems with overlap and duplication of information. With these gaps in reporting, it has often been difficult to assess what the real achievements of the C-NAP have been.

Yet 2016 provides an opportunity to turn over a new leaf and move forward to develop an improved NAP with bold commitments. If the recent commitments made by the new Liberal Government are indications of the government’s policy directions, this is an opportunity to seize.118

To that end, we have identified five key considerations for moving forward on a new and improved NAP:

- **The need to look back.** In preparing for a new, updated NAP the Government of Canada can build on the Inclusive Security review and assess what worked, what didn’t work and what was learned from this first-generation NAP.

- **The need to look around.** We hope that the development of the new NAP will include broad consultations with Canadians – women’s organizations, development organizations, humanitarian agencies, peace groups, diaspora networks, new Canadians recently arrived from conflict zones, academics and others. There may also be creative ways to seek input from women in zones of armed conflict. New issues – such as the links between the WPS agenda and the extractive industry, countering violence extremism, refugees – also deserve consideration.

- **The need to look out.** This year 2015 saw significant research on the women, peace and security agenda, on NAPs, on promoting women’s participation in peace processes, on making progress on sexual violence in conflict, and other related

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117 See the contributions to this collection, the 2014 WPSN-C Worth the Wait? report, and various letters to Ministers of Foreign Affairs on the WPSN-C website (all unanswered).

118 For example, the commitment to a gender-balanced cabinet and to an inquiry on missing and murdered Indigenous women.
issues. In constructing the next NAP it will be important to learn from what others have done and what has been learned globally.

- **The need to look in.** The effectiveness of Canada’s advocacy on WPS depends on a number of factors, including our credibility to speak on these issues. In many circles Canada does have a strong global reputation. Unfortunately this reputation has been strained in the last few years, as people pointed to our domestic record on issues such as missing and murdered indigenous women, the situation of women and LGBTQ people within our military, and our declining investments in official development assistance. The connections between our foreign policy and domestic policy are clear, as is the need to make progress on both fronts.\[119\]

- **The need to look forward.** One of the dangers of NAPs is the potential to get caught up in the bureaucratic details. The number of people trained becomes more important than what people did with their new knowledge and skills. Indicators are reported on, but not analyzed for progress and gaps. We focus more on the process around the progress reports, rather than what is changing. With this in mind, it will be important to ensure that a future NAP takes us forward not only by addressing current criticisms and gaps, but by proposing meaningful actions for meaningful change.

As Canada’s current five-year commitment to WPS objectives draws to an end, we hope that the new government will seize the opportunity and put forward a new and improved NAP. There is an important opportunity to look boldly at the future and ask what contributions Canada can make to this global agenda. A critical look back and an ambitious look forward are two steps towards meaningful future progress.

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\[119\] The ‘universality’ of the new Sustainable Development Goals reinforce this point. See, for example, Diana Rivington (2015), *We Need a Canada-Wide Approach to Achieve Women’s Rights*. [http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/development-unplugged/sdg-womens-rights_b_8314320.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/development-unplugged/sdg-womens-rights_b_8314320.html)
### Annex 1

**C-NAP Indicator Compilation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 1-1: Number and percentage of organizations receiving Government of Canada funding for humanitarian assistance that have organizational codes of conduct relating to sexual exploitation and abuse consistent with the core principles of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Plan of Action on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises.</td>
<td>24 partners. Only 7 partners have been assessed. Of these 7, 2 have codes of conduct consistent with IASC guidelines</td>
<td>23 partners. Only 7 assessed. Of these 7, only 2 have Codes of Conduct consistent with IASC guidelines</td>
<td>35 partners. 35 partners with code of conduct relating to PSEA. No further information provided regarding partners assessed or consistency of partner code of conduct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 2-1: Percentage of Government of Canada departmental pre-deployment or general training courses, including courses taken while deployed on mission, for peace operations, in fragile states or in conflict-affected situations that examine the differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls and address key issues such as codes of conduct, cultural awareness,</td>
<td>CIDA: 1 of 22 (5%) DFAIT: % not provided (^{120}) The pre-deployment training provided by DFAIT in FY did not examine the issues listed RCMP: 100%</td>
<td>CIDA: 17% DFAIT: 10% RCMP: 100%</td>
<td>DFATD: % not provided (^{121}), DND: %not provided (^{122}), RCMP: 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{120}\) Reporting does list information on DFAIT training on “gender awareness.”

\(^{121}\) START officers participated in the Gender Based Equality course offered department-wide, as well as the GBA+ online course offered through Status of Women.

\(^{122}\) Deployed personnel received cultural awareness training on “peace support operations or to fragile states or conflict-affected situations incorporated gender considerations”. Pre-deployment training included an “examination of the differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls”. Annual training for CANSOFCOM personnel encompasses “Laws of Armed Conflict, Human Rights, and Rules of Engagement, topics which apply to all persons involved in or affected by conflict, including women and girls”.

*Looking Back, Looking Forward: Reflections on Canada’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* -55-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS, trafficking in persons, and Canadian and international law applicable to the protection and promotion of women's and girls' human rights.</td>
<td>CIDA: 2 of 5 (40%) (participants: 2W; non-participants: 2W, 1M)(^{123})(^\text{DFAIT: no % provided}) (^{124})(^\text{RCMP: 100% (193)})</td>
<td>CIDA: 45% (9 of 20)(^{125})(^\text{DFAIT: 42% (28 of 66)}) (^{124})(^\text{DND: implied 100%})(^{124})(^\text{RCMP: 100% (all 152)})</td>
<td>DFATD: 2 out of 21 (9.5%) (START) 20 out of 65 (31%)(^{125})(^\text{(CFLI)})(^{126}) DND: 100%(^{125})(^\text{RCMP: 100% (all 112)})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indicator 2-2:** Number and percentage of Government of Canada personnel deployed to peace operations, fragile states or conflict-affected situations who receive pre-deployment training or training while deployed on mission that examines the differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls and addresses key issues such as codes of conduct, cultural awareness, HIV/AIDS, trafficking in persons, and Canadian and international law applicable to the protection and promotion of women's and girls' human rights.

CIDA: report on content of gender training, 1 voluntary 90-minute session on the WPS UNSCRs was held\(^{125}\)\(^\text{DFAIT: one-day gender awareness course was mandatory for policy and programming staff, but this was not provided to any personnel selected for deployment to fragile states}\) \(^{124}\)\(^\text{RCMP: specific training on the WPS UNSCRs}\) | DFAIT: all START training reflected Canada’s commitment to UNSCRs on WPS DND: training on human rights and law of armed conflict; cultural awareness training; individual pre-deployment training RCMP: provided specific training on the UNSCRs | DFATD: START is reviewing its training program for rapid responders and deployees to increase the gender awareness component of pre-deployment training. For 2013-14, the training course for CFLI did not include an adequate gender component DND: mandatory training on human |

\(^{123}\) Does this mean that only 5 CIDA staff were assigned to conflict affected countries in FY11/12?  
\(^{124}\) Deployed personnel received “pre-deployment cultural awareness training that incorporated gender considerations, as well as codes of conduct and training on Canadian and international law and human rights applicable to the protection and promotion of women’s and girls' human rights.”  
\(^{125}\) These individuals participated in one of four hour-long teleconference on Gender Based Analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>provided</td>
<td>rights and the law of armed conflict - training addressed protection of vulnerable groups, including women and girls; mandatory culture awareness training - training considered the impact of gender on operations, such as when interacting with the local population; individual pre-deployment training – included Human Rights and Women in Conflict modules that address UNSCRs on WPS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 3-1: Extent to which programming delivered under the Military Training and Cooperation Programme (MTCP), Anti-Crime Capacity-Building Program (ACCBP), Counter-Terrorism Capacity-Building Program (CTCBP) and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) and similar Government of Canada international programs in the justice and security sector operationalizes an analysis of the differential impact of conflict on women and girls.</td>
<td>DFAIT: START/GPSF projects 74 projects (39%): no gender analysis 68 projects (36%): limited integration 37 projects (20%): integrated 10 projects (5%): specific to gender equality (Total 189 projects)</td>
<td>DFAIT: START 46 projects (36%): no gender analysis 52 projects (41%): limited integration 21 projects (16%): integrated 9 projects (7%): specific to gender equality (total 129 projects)</td>
<td>DFAIT: All civilian deployment programs, projects and deployments are reviewed for gender risks and benchmarks. Terms of reference for all civilian deployments take into account the differential impact of conflict on women and girls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation and Representation</td>
<td>DFAIT Canadian Security Sector</td>
<td>DFAIT new Americas strategy</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 10-1: Number of Canadian strategic-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>1st report (FY 2011/12)</td>
<td>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</td>
<td>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Report</td>
<td>Reform guidelines have gender equality as a principle and a reference to the C-NAP</td>
<td>includes indicators on women’s rights</td>
<td>Security System Reform guidelines include promotion of gender equality as a principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 10-2: Number of Canadian strategic-level national and international security policy directives or guiding documents that address the deployment of women to peace operations.</td>
<td>In this first year of C-NAP implementation, no data was available on this indicator.</td>
<td>DND: not explicitly reported</td>
<td>“All CAF positions are open to women and men”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 10-3: Number and percentage of female Canadian Forces personnel, police officers and civilian Government of Canada personnel deployed to peace operations.</td>
<td>DFAIT: 29 Canada-based civilian experts funded, 14 (or 48.3%) were women</td>
<td>DFAIT: during the reporting period START funded 66 Cdn-based civilian experts. Of these 22 (or 33%) were women</td>
<td>DFATD: START funded the deployment of 21 Canada-based civilian experts to international organizations and in response to international crises. 7 (33%) of these were women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DND:126 All military personnel: 10.5%</td>
<td>DND: as of March 2013, 145 of 1142 (10%) of deployed CAF personnel on international operations were women. During the reporting year, 11 of 46 (24%) of civilian employees deployed in support of CAF designated international operations were women.</td>
<td>DND: 69 of 516 (13.4%) deployed CAF personnel on international operations were women. 585 women of a total of 5387 (10.9%) personnel were deployed on international operations. 6 of 14 (43%) civilian employees deployed in support of CAF designated international operations were women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brigadier-General/Commodore: 11% (% that were female)</td>
<td>RCMP: 26 of 241 participants were women (10.8%)</td>
<td>RCMP: Of 112 personnel who were deployed to police peace operations, 21 (19%) were women.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

126 Reporting includes a full table by rank.
## Indicator 10-4: Number and percentage of voluntary selection processes for Government of Canada personnel to deploy on peace operations that offer specific measures which work to identify and address barriers to women's participation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFATD:</td>
<td>unless a request for Cdn expertise included a specific request for women, candidates were sought on an equal-opportunity basis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Over the course of 2013-14, at any given time, the average rate of female police participation over the reporting period was 15%.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP:</td>
<td>took a holistic approach to addressing barriers to the participation of police officers in peace operations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND:</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### DFATD:
- No Government of Canada civilian personnel were deployed on peace operations during the reporting period. Unless a request for Cdn expertise included a specific request for women, candidates were sought on an equal-opportunity basis.

### RCMP:
- Percentage cannot be determined. The RCMP has attempted to increase awareness of the program and promote female participation in peace operations through various means.

### DND:
- None

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**Indicator 10-5: Number and proportion of women in executive-level roles in Government of Canada departments and agencies involved in peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA:</td>
<td>21 out of 43 (49%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFATD:</td>
<td>4 out of 6 (67%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP:</td>
<td>2 (proportion cannot be determined)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DND:</td>
<td>none</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CIDA:
- 38 (48.1%)

### DFATD:
- 3 (60%)

### DND:
- 60 out of 138 (44%) civilian employees occupying executive level positions were women, including 3 of the 6 of the most senior executive level position. 13.5% of Combined Regular

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127 “The CAF does not differentiate between women and men when selecting personnel for international operations including peace support operations.”

128 “The CAF does not differentiate between women and men when selecting personnel for international operations including peace support operations.”

129 Does this include DFATD personnel posted in conflict-affected countries? It would also be interesting to see a male/female breakdown of the ambassadors serving in these countries.

130 More detail is included in the report.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Force/Primary Reserve Force Senior Officers (Major to Colonel) in the CAF were women, including 4.5% of Flag Officers (Brigadier-General or Commodore and above). The Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) and Deputy Director-General of International Security Policy were female.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Force/Primary Reserve Force Senior Officers (Major to Colonel) in the CAF were women, including 4.5% of Flag Officers (Brigadier-General or Commodore and above). The Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) and Deputy Director-General of International Security Policy were female.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RCMP: 3 from the RCMP, plus additional women from other Canadian partner police services. Proportion cannot be determined.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 12-1:</strong> Number and percentage of departmental international security policy frameworks that integrate the participation and representation of women and girls.</td>
<td>DFAIT: 6</td>
<td>DFAIT continuously integrates the participation and representation of women and girls in new departmental international security policy frameworks. <em>No examples provided</em></td>
<td>DFAIT: Supports at least 29 Canadian Partners (in one or multiple countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIDA</strong> 23 of CIDA’s 91 WPS-related projects supported the participation of women and girls In 2011/12, $28.37 million of CIDA’s WPS-related investments ($179.29 million) specifically address or integrated gender equality results 131 DFAIT 52% of GPSF projects (98) integrated the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIDA</strong> 6 of 55 WPS-related projects focused on participation of women and girls During 2012/13, $7.86 million of WPS investments ($16.9 million) either specifically addressed or integrated gender equality results. DFAIT CFLI: 89 projects ($1.9 million) with ¼ of CFLI projects in fragile states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DFATD:</strong> 79 (40%) of the CFLI projects in fragile states were primarily focused on improving women’s participation and representation (compared to 24% of projects in 2012-13). Approximately $1.8 million was disbursed for these projects.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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131 CIDA’s reporting notes that a WPS project may address more than one C-NAP indicator, and that, in some cases, only one component of a project contributes to a WPS objective, so it should not be assumed that 100% of the project disbursement went directly to support women and girls’ participation. This qualification is repeated in the 2012/13 progress report and for indicators 18-2, 20-1 and 21-2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>1st report (FY 2011/12)</th>
<th>2nd Report (FY 2012/13)</th>
<th>3rd Report (FY 2013/14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and girls.</td>
<td>participation and involvement of women and girls. Total value was $36.8 million</td>
<td>focused on improving women’s participation and representation. START: 88 projects out of 129 included the meaningful participation of women.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 13-1: Number of Canadian interventions in the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly, Special Committee on Peacekeeping or other relevant international fora that explicitly encourage troop- and police-contributing countries to address the participation of women in peace operations and in training for peace operations.</td>
<td>4 (4th Committee in Nov 11, 3rd Committee in Oct 11, Security Council in Oct 11 and C34 in Feb 12)</td>
<td>3 (4th Committee in Oct 12, UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in Feb 13 and Security Council in Nov 12)</td>
<td>2 - Special Political and Decolonization Committee, November 2013 and in joint Canada, Australia and New Zealand statement to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (February 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>DFAIT Reports provided by the Canadian Embassies in Haiti and Afghanistan. RCMP Developed monthly reporting templates which will require each police officer deployed to report on this issue. Expected to roll out in 2012/13</td>
<td>No information/reporting. This indicator does not appear in the report and the next indicator is labelled 16-1</td>
<td>RCMP: In 2012/13, implemented the monthly reporting templates mentioned in FY 2011/12. During FY2013/14 the individual monthly reporting was modified to be reported on a quarterly basis. All deployed police in each peace operation must complete these mandatory reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 16-1: Extent to which Canadian diplomatic offices and deployed Canadian Forces or police personnel include information on observed or credibly reported serious violations of women’s and girls’ human rights in their periodic reporting to competent mission authorities on peace operations.</td>
<td>DFAIT: 0 RCMP: 0</td>
<td>DND: no report RCMP: 0 Police Partner Agency: 2 a) 100%</td>
<td>DND: 0 RCMP: 0 Police Partner Agency: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 16-2: Number of reported cases of sexual exploitation or abuse in peace operations, fragile states</td>
<td>DFAIT: 0 RCMP: 0</td>
<td>DND: no report RCMP: 0 Police Partner Agency: 2 a) 100%</td>
<td>DND: 0 RCMP: 0 Police Partner Agency: 1</td>
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</table>

132 The reporting is unclear. Is 89 the total of CFLI projects? What is the total number of CFLI projects in fragile states? What is the total number of CFLI projects that addressed women’s participation? 133 Again the reporting is unclear. The report mentions that just under $43 million was disbursed. Is this the total of START projects? The report also notes “Engagement of women/girls in all phases of peace operations consumed the highest allocation of GPSF programming when compared to other areas of focus.” How is this measured? What are the other areas of focus?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
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<td>and conflict-affected situations, allegedly perpetrated by Canadian military personnel, police or civilian Government officials, and the percentage that are: a) referred to a competent Canadian authority, b) addressed in a timely, appropriate and transparent manner.</td>
<td>b) 100% DFAIT: no report</td>
<td>a) 100% b) 100% DFATD: no report</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 17-1: Percentage of relevant region- or mission-specific pre-deployment or field training modules for Government of Canada personnel on protection issues that address in a meaningful way the differential impact of the conflict on women and girls.</td>
<td>DFAIT: none RCMP: all content is in one module, rather than incorporating into other modules</td>
<td>DFAIT: 10% of START training courses (1 out of 10 – course focused on gender-based analysis) DND: all RCMP: all content is in 1 module, not incorporated into other modules</td>
<td>DFATD: 10% of START training courses (1 out of 10 – course focused on gender-based analysis plus) DND: all RCMP: percentage not applicable. Rather than incorporating this training into various modules, the RCMP has taken the approach of providing a region- or mission-specific pre-deployment training session on protection issues and the differential impact of conflict on women and girls to police deploying to peace operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicator 17-2: Number and percentage of Government of Canada personnel deployed to peace operations, fragile states or conflict-affected situations who receive region- or mission-specific pre-deployment or field training on protection issues that addresses the differential impact of the conflict on women and girls in a</td>
<td>DFAIT: none RCMP: 158 (81%)</td>
<td>DFAIT: 6.9% (6 out of 66 deployed, but training was received in previous year) DND: all RCMP: 86% (131 out of 152)</td>
<td>DFATD: 0%134 DND: All CAF personnel who deployed to peace support operations, fragile states, or conflict-affected situations received mission-specific pre-deployment training that addressed the protection of vulnerable groups, including women and</td>
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134 The only course offered during this report period was the online Gender training. Participation in this course was not tracked. This will be done for the next reporting period.

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<td>meaningful way.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>girls. RCM: 100% (all 112)</td>
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<td><strong>Indicator 17-3:</strong> Extent to which DND/Canadian Forces strategic direction or equivalent policy guidance for deployed Canadian police address in a meaningful way the importance of protecting women’s and girls’ human rights on international operational deployments.</td>
<td>RCM: Made progress on the development of ConOps for its missions. These will include a section on gender and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights</td>
<td><strong>No reporting provided</strong></td>
<td>RCM: continues to use the Concept of Operations (ConOps) approach to guide its engagement in peace operations, which could include the multinational organization’s strategic direction or ConOps documents with specific direction or guidance on the protection of human rights for women and girls.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 18-1:</strong> Number of departmental international security policy frameworks that integrate the promotion and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights in a manner which incorporates an analysis of the differential impact of conflict on women and girls.</td>
<td>DFAIT: 1 (new Americas Strategy Implementation Plan for FY 2012-2013 includes objective 2.4.5, Canada will seek to “strengthen justice sector reform...”)</td>
<td><strong>DFAIT: not reported on</strong></td>
<td><strong>DFATD: No policy frameworks undertaken this year.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Indicator 18-2:</strong> Number of and funding disbursed for Government of Canada-funded projects that integrate the promotion and protection of women’s and girls’ human rights in a manner which incorporates an analysis of the differential</td>
<td>CIDA 43 of the 91 WPS-related projects focused on this theme $73.06 million of CIDA’s total WPS-related investments ($179.29 million) either specifically addressed or integrated gender</td>
<td>CIDA 11 of the 55 WPS-related projects focused on this theme $19.57 million of CIDA’s WPS-related investments ($164.9 million) either specifically addressed or integrated gender equality results</td>
<td><strong>DFATD: the Global Issues and Development Branch funded 41 WPS related projects. Of those, 6 projects, totalling $10.8 million</strong>[^136], focussed on supporting the promotion and protection of women’s</td>
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[^135]: Information provided under this indicator relates to the Canadian position at the Third Meeting of States Parties of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2012 – “Canada advocated for mainstreaming gender and diversity issues into the implementation of the Convention and encouraged States Parties and partners to integrate gender considerations into all of their mine action and cluster munitions-related programming.” While this is an admirable position, it does not correspond to the indicator which focuses on Canadian security frameworks.

[^136]: In some cases, only a component of the project may contribute to supporting the human rights of women and girls. It should not be assumed that 100% of the project disbursement went directly to support women’s and girls’ human rights. These figures have been calculated manually, and therefore have not been verified by the Chief Financial Officer.
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<td>Impact of conflict on women and girls.</td>
<td>equality results DFAIT 107 GPSF projects (58%) integrated the promotion and protection of women's and girls' rights. Total funding disbursed for these 107 projects was $42.58 million</td>
<td>DFAIT/START 64 out of 129 projects (50%) addressed this theme</td>
<td>and girls' human rights. 49 projects were funded; of these, 18 were specifically focussed on women's and girls' rights. Funding levels were as follows: - Women, Peace, and Security: $2,919,430 - Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict: $2,619,197 - Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: $2,346,301</td>
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<td>Indicator 19-1: Extent to which Government of Canada departmental guidance documents for specific peace operations explicitly address the protection and promotion of women's and girls' human rights, including measures to prevent sexual violence.</td>
<td>DFAIT: reporting focuses on WPS-related activities carried out by Cdn embassies, not departmental guidance documents RCMP: progress made on new ConOps. These will include a section on gender and the protection of women's and girls' rights</td>
<td>DFAIT: reporting focuses on training modules/curriculum available, not guidance documents</td>
<td>RCMP: Canadian police often deploy through multilateral organizations, which have their own mandate, Concept of Operations, and strategic direction regarding the protection of human rights for women and girls. Canadian police follow the guidance provided by these organizations in this respect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicator 20-1: Number of and funding disbursed for Government of Canada-funded projects for or in peace operations, fragile states and conflict-affected situations that integrate support for women's and girls' human rights including protection from violence, sexual violence, sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls and trafficking in persons.</td>
<td>CIDA 32 of the 91 WPS-related projects focused on this theme $67.64 million of the CIDA's total WPS-related investments ($179.29 million) specifically addressed or integrated gender equality results in this area DFAIT 59 GPSF projects (31%) supported these issues with a total value of $26.6 million</td>
<td>CIDA 23 of 55 WPS-related projects focused on this theme $87.65 million of the total WPS-related investments ($164.9 million) specifically addressed or integrated gender equality results in this area DFAIT CFLI: 23 CFLI initiatives (totalling $496,625) supported this theme START: 35 out of 129 projects (27%) addressed this theme. Funding disbursed: $21.2 million</td>
<td>DFATD: Supports at least 13 Canadian Partners (in one or multiple countries)</td>
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### Relief and Recovery

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<td><strong>Indicator 21-1</strong>: Number and percentage of departmental planning frameworks for fragile states and conflict-affected situations that integrate the needs and capacities of women and girls.</td>
<td>CIDA Countries with approved strategies that consider the needs of women and girls: 8 out of 10 (80%) All 18 institutional strategies to work with key multilateral partners include strategic objectives related to gender equality CIDA has guidelines for development cooperation &amp; program mgt in fragile &amp; conflict affected situations. Both guides reinforce the importance of gender analysis as well as gender-equality specific areas of intervention (developed before the NAP) DFAIT 16 (1 memorandum to cabinet, 2 logic models, 2 thematic papers and all 11 of the START multi-year frameworks)</td>
<td>CIDA All 18 institutional strategies that guide work with key multilateral partners include strategic objectives related to gender equality &amp; 2 have explicit commitments on integrating the needs &amp; capacities of women and girls in fragile states and conflict-affected situations Non-aggregated information is presented on country programs. DFAIT No new START planning frameworks developed in this FY</td>
<td>DFATD: Number and percentage not indicated.</td>
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<td><strong>Indicator 21-2</strong>: Number of and funding disbursed for Government of Canada-funded projects in or for peace operations, fragile states and conflict situations that integrate the needs and capacities of women and girls in relief and recovery efforts.</td>
<td>CIDA 38 of the 91 WPS projects focused on this theme. $95.12 million of the total WPS investment ($179.29 million) specifically addressed or integrated gender equality results in this area. DFAIT 61 GPSF projects (32%)</td>
<td>CIDA 37 of the 55 WPS-focused projects focused on integrating needs and capacities of women and girls in relief and recovery efforts $86 million of the WPS-related investments ($164.9 million) addressed this theme DFAIT 69 out of 129 projects</td>
<td>DFATD: 41 projects. $148,425,000 disbursed.</td>
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137 Again, this reporting is not clear. The report notes that “This is the Stabilization and Reconstruction Programs’ lowest scoring indicator for the 2012/13 fiscal year for the second consecutive year.”

138 Information also provided on the 4 priorities for Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan announced in Nov 2010. “The promotion of women’s human rights is highlighted as a mainstreamed, cross-cutting theme of the security, rule of law and human rights priority…”

139 Provides examples from 7 countries.
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<td>of all projects) integrated the needs and capacities of women and girls in relief and recovery efforts. Total funds disbursed for these projects is $21.63 million</td>
<td>(53%) gave women management, control and/or access to resources and benefits.(^{140})</td>
<td>Funds disbursed: $40.6 million</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{140}\) It is not clear if this refers to projects focused on relief and recovery or the whole START portfolio.
Annex 2

Contributors

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